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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Though Salt Lake City has listed five questions with 
multiple subquestions, respondent Hoskings asserts that there are 
no questions this Court should consider. The Court of Appeals 
decision raises only the following issues for which the standards 
for resolution as followed by the Court of Appeals were 
established by this Court in its earlier decisions on point. 
1. Did Warren Hoskings present a prima facie case of "odd 
lot" "permanent total disability" as a result of his industrial 
ankle injury and other employability factors as required by the 
Workers Compensation Act of Utah (§35-1-67 U.C.A., 1987 Cum. 
Supp., Repl. Vol. 4(B) 1974 Ed.) as interpreted in multiple Utah 
Appellate Court decisions; and if so, 
2. Did Salt Lake City present competent substantive 
evidence as opposed to uncorroborated hearsay of "...regular, 
dependable work available for [Mr. Hoskings] without the 
expectation that he will rely on the sympathy of friends or his 
own 'superhuman efforts'"? Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet 
Management and Second Injury Fund, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986) at 
1326-1327. 
REFERENCE TO THE OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals decision is found at Hoskings v. 
Industrial Commission, 291 Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah App. 1996), 
P.2d (Utah App. 1996). It is attached hereto in its entirety 
as Appendix 1. 
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STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE SUPREME COURT IS INVOKED 
The Court of Appeals entered its decision in this matter on 
May 31, 1996. There was no petition for rehearing filed. No 
petition for rehearing was filed by Warren Hoskings. 
Respondent agrees that the Supreme Court has discretionary 
jurisdiction to grant or deny petitions for writs of certiorari 
pursuant to §78-2-2(5) U.C.A. and Rules 45 and 46 Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Respondent disagrees with Salt Lake City that the Court of 
Appeals has incorrectly decided important issues of law which 
have not been settled by this Court involving "retirement 
benefits to municipal employees" or that the opinion of the Court 
of Appeals is in any way in conflict with decisions issued by 
this Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Permanent total disability--Amount of payments--
Vocational rehabilitation--Procedure and Payments, §35-1-67 
U.C.A., Replacement Volume 4B 1974 Edition, 1987 Cumulative 
Supplement. (See Appendix 2 hereto.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case . 
This matter was before the Court of Appeals by means of 
Warren Hoskings' Petition for Review of an Industrial Commission 
Order Granting Salt Lake City's Motion For Review (R. 211-215 and 
Appendix 3 hereto) of an administrative law judge's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 148-170 and Appendix 4 
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hereto) granting permanent total disability benefits. (R. 317) 
Mr. Hoskings had been a fire fighter for Salt Lake City 
Corporation until his retirement September 1, 1988. (R. 318) 
2. Course of Proceedings at Industrial Commission. 
A. Warren Hoskings filed an Application for Hearing 
April 16, 1990, in which he claimed that Salt Lake City 
Corporation had refused to pay among other things: 
1. Medical expenses; 
2. Temporary total disability benefits; 
3. Permanent partial disability benefits; 
4. Permanent total disability benefits. 
(R. 1) 
B. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on January 8, 
1992. (R. 278-372) The administrative law judge referred the 
matter to a medical panel in March of 1992. (R. 65-72) The 
medical panel report was received by the Industrial Commission on 
May 13, 1992. (R. 73-81) Neither party objected to the panel 
report. The medical panel found that Mr. Hoskings left ankle 
injury was caused by the industrial accident, had been getting 
progressively worse and resulted in a whole man impairment of 11% 
with an additional 4% whole man impairment resulting from prior 
industrial injuries. (R. 80-81) 
C. On August 3, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge 
found Mr. Hoskings tentatively in the "odd-lot" category and 
pursuant to §35-1-67 U.C.A. 1985, referred him to the State 
Division of Rehabilitation Services (hereinafter "DRS") for 
3 
rehabilitation training. (R. 91) DRS found that applicant 
Hoskings had cooperated fully and was incapable of being 
rehabilitated because of his physical limitations and other 
employability factors. (R. 103-104) 
3• Disposition at Industrial Commission. 
A. On June 30, 1994, the Administrative Law Judge 
entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 
148-170 Appendix 4 hereto) in which permanent total disability 
benefits were awarded. 
B. On July 26, 1994, Salt Lake City Corporation filed 
a Motion For Review of the administrative law judge's order. (R. 
173-174 with Memo in Support R. 175-190) Mr. Hoskings responded 
by a Reply to Salt Lake City's Motion For Review dated August 10, 
1994. (R. 191-206) The Commission overruled the administrative 
law judge, asserting that Mr. Hoskings is not an "odd-lot" 
employee and secondly that even if he is there is other work Mr. 
Hoskings can do. (R. 248-253, Appendix 3 hereto) 
4. Disposition by the Court of Appeals 
The Court of Appeals entered its opinion on May 31, 19961, 
in which it reversed the Industrial Commission and reinstated the 
administrative law judge's finding of permanent total disability 
holding: 
A. Warren Hoskings met his prima facie burden. He is 
an "odd-lot" worker by uncontroverted evidence that: (1) he can 
x
. Hoskings v. Industrial Commission, 2 91 Adv. Rep. 17 
(Utah App. 1996), P.2d (Utah App. 1996), Appendix 1 
hereto. 
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no longer perform his prior duties as a fire fighter for the Salt 
Lake City Fire Department as a result of his industrial ankle 
injury and (2) he fully cooperating with the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services (DRS) which found he cannot reasonably be 
rehabilitated. Therefore, the burden shifted to Salt Lake City 
to prove the reasonable availability to Mr. Hoskings of regular, 
steady work in a well known branch of the labor market factoring 
in his age, physical condition, education, work experience and 
other "employability" factors. id. at 18-21. 
B. Salt Lake City failed to meet its burden. It 
presented only a hearsay report by a rehabilitation counselor 
from a company known as Intracorp. who did not testify at the 
hearing. Salt Lake City did not present a "residuum" of 
competent substantive evidence to satisfy its burden. id. at 18-
21. 
C. Even if the substance of the Intracorp. report is 
considered, it fails to define "job availability" in the context 
of the disabilities suffered by Mr. Hoskings. Allegations of 
general job availability to the public at large is not 
sufficient. id. at 18-21.2 
2
. In addition to the rulings A. B. and C , in dicta, the 
Court of Appeals also concluded that "...[0]nee the DRS certified 
to the Commission in writing that Hoskings could not be 
rehabilitated [based on Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (1974) (repealed 
1988 Utah Laws, ch. 116, §4], all inquiry into the issue of 
rehabilitation--a question delegated by the Legislature not to 
the Commission, but to DRS--should have ended. As we read the 
statute, the Commission was unable to revisit the issue of 
rehabilitation or to consider other evidence, such as the 
Intracorp. report presented by Salt Lake City Corporation." 291 
Utah Adv. Rep. 17 at 20. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. Background. 
Warren Hoskings was born December 6, 1935. He is currently 
sixty years old. (R. 295) He graduated from Granite High School 
in Salt Lake City, He attended Trade Tech from 1958 to 1960. He 
received an associates' degree in electronics. He worked as a 
test technician for Sperry from about 1960 to 1965. He has had 
no other jobs in the area of electronics since 1965. He worked 
as a fire fighter for Salt Lake City from January 3, 1966, to 
September 1, 1988. (R. 296-299) Throughout his career he was 
called upon to do all of the physically demanding duties of a 
fire fighter even as he progressed through the ranks to finally 
become a Captain. (R. 298-301) 
II. Accident of April 6, 1986. 
Mr. Hoskings first injured his left leg and ankle in an 
industrial accident on May 6, 1980. He was involved in fighting 
a fire and fell through a hole in the floor. He felt a sharp 
pain in his left leg, burned his hands and hurt his back. He was 
off work from May 6, 1980 to September of 1980. (R. 303-306; See 
also Dr. Thomas Noonan office chart and reports at R. 411-434.) 
On April 6 1986, Mr. Hoskings reinjured his left leg and 
ankle when he jumped from one of the crash trucks and landed on a 
"loaded" hose {one that is full of water). He severely twisted 
his ankle. (R. 308-311) 
Mr. Hoskings did not miss work immediately after the injury. 
He continued to work from then until his retirement September 1, 
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1988. The injury plagued him with limitations. The pain 
continued unabated. The pain was severe enough that he could not 
sleep at night. He testified that the intensity of the pain 
varied depending on how much activity he did. It especially hurt 
when he worked on concrete floors. The symptoms through that 
period and to the time of the hearing in this matter continually 
got worse. Mr. Hoskings testified every step he takes has pain 
associated with it. The distance he can walk is limited though 
most days he can walk a block or two before the pain becomes too 
great. Each of the doctors warned him that he would have 
trouble if he continued fire fighting. He felt he was creating a 
safety hazard for his fellow fire fighters because of the 
limitations the ankle was placing on his activities. (R. 67-68; 
317-318; 323-324) 
III. Medical Treatment 
Immediately after the accident, Mr. Hoskings' battalion 
chief sent him to the Industrial Clinic where he was examined and 
treated by a number of doctors. (R. 311) Eventually, the 
applicant went to see Dr. R. Kunz, a podiatrist from June of 1986 
through April, 1987. (R. 407-410) 
When Mr. Hoskings symptoms did not improve over time, he was 
examined or treated by the following physicians: 
1. At Salt Lake City's request, orthopedic surgeon Dr. 
Thomas Noonan, June, 1987 (R.427-429); 
2. By referral from Dr. Kunz, podiatrist Dr. J. Page, who 
recommended surgery in August, 1987 (R. 465-466) 
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3. At Salt Lake City's request, orthopedic surgeon Dr. G. 
L. Rasmussen, February, 198 8 through August 23, 1991 (R. 43 8-
443) ;3 Dr. Rasmussen acknowledged that surgery was an option 
to consider to resolve the pain. (R. 442) 
4. At Salt Lake City's request4, orthopedic surgeon Dr. 
Robert P. Hansen, July 20, 1989 (R. 397-399); 
5. Orthopedic surgeon Dr. Brent M. Pratley, January, 1990 
(R. 435-436) ; 
6. At Salt Lake City's request, physiatrist Dr. Scott 
Knorpp, December, 1993 (R. 226-231) 
Not one of the physicians ever opined that Warren Hoskings 
could return to his former duties as a fire fighter. 
The Administrative Law Judge referred the medical issues to 
a Medical Panel comprised of Drs. Boyd Holbrook and Gerald 
Moress. The report was admitted into evidence without objection 
by either party. The Panel found that Mr. Hoskings suffered 
significant physical limitations resulting from his work related 
injuries. (R. 76-81) 
3
. Recalling Mr. Hoskings retirement September 1, 1988, of 
particular note in Dr. Rasmussen's records are the continuing 
pain complaints in nine visits from February 22, 1988, through 
September 12, 1988. (R. 438-439) 
4
. Note that this is within one year of the early 
retirement. Dr. Hansen's chart reflects that Mr. Hoskings 
persisted with left knee and foot problems despite his inactivity 
after the retirement. He recorded that any motion of the foot 
caused pain and that Mr. Hoskings especially had problems with 
uneven ground and stairways. He ruled out a return to fire 
fighting activity. (R. 397) 
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IV, Early Retirement September 1, 1988. 
Mr. Hoskings retired from Salt Lake City effective September 
1, 1988. He testified that Salt Lake City was offering early 
retirement incentives to employees during 1988. Mr. Hoskings 
qualified for the incentive package because of his long years of 
service. As shown by the uncontroverted medical evidence, he was 
having significant and unrelenting problems with his injured 
ankle. He testified his doctors recommended he should not 
continue as a fire fighter. He felt he was a safety hazard for 
his fellow fire fighters. He wanted to continue in the job he 
loved, but could not. (R. 318-319; 350-351; 356-357) 
V. Employment Since Early Retirement. 
Mr. Hoskings was able to find a "special" seasonal job 
opportunity that was adaptable to his limitations during the 
spring to summer months of 1990 and 1991. From April 22, 1990 
through September 23, 1990, he was hired by Hamilton Stores, a 
concessionaire in Yellowstone National Park, as a fire marshal. 
His job was to teach fire safety procedures to personnel in 
stores run by Hamilton within the boundaries of the park. It was 
a job position required by the Park.Service of its 
concessionaires though the duties were light and very limited. 
The job paid $850.00 per month for the five month period. 
In 1991, Mr. Hoskings planned to do the seasonal job again. 
The pay was increased to $875.00 per month. However, the 
position was changed to be year-round. Mr. Hoskings could not 
accept a full time position for two main reasons: (1) he did not 
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want to abandon his Utah homes; and (2) the very cold winter 
environment would be too hard on his left ankle. He worked that 
summer for two months from April to June training his 
replacement. (R. 324-328/ 341-343/ 351-353/ 360) 
VI. Comparison of Vocational Rehabilitation Evaluations. 
A. Division of Rehabilitation Services. 
As required by the Workers Compensation Act, the 
administrative law judge referred Mr. Hoskings to the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services on August 3, 1992. (R. 91) The case was 
assigned to Certified Rehabilitation Counselor Frank Miera. (R. 
472). Mr. Miera is a highly qualified 16 year rehabilitation 
counseling veteran. (R. 473) He leads a team of highly trained 
and experienced professionals in evaluating the feasibility and 
potential of individuals with various handicaps for retraining 
and placement in viable jobs in the real world. (R. 474, 490) 
Counselor Miera performed an intake evaluation which 
included a review of the complete Industrial Commission file and 
a thorourh interview with Mr. Hoskings. He referred Mr. Hoskings 
for a five day evaluation from November 2, 1992, to November 6, 
1992. The evaluation included testing from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 
p.m. on consecutive days with two fifteen minute breaks and one 
half to one hour for lunch. (R. 474-476, 490) The evaluator in 
this instance was Pam VanCura. (R. 480) 
Ms. VanCura concluded as follows after the five days of the 
evaluation: 
Evaluation results indicated that he would 
experience a high degree of pain and fatigue 
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if employed on even a part-time basis of 
approximately 20 hours per week. 
(R. 495)(Emphasis Added)(See also R. 492-494) 
After more than one year of telephonic contacts with Mr. 
Hoskings, Mr. Miera reported to the administrative law judge on 
October 15, 1993: 
Due to this individual's work evaluation, his 
documented self-reported health problems, it 
has been determined that he is unable at this 
time to be involved in any type of 
rehabilitation program geared toward full-
time or part-time employment. 
(R. 103-104) 
At his deposition, Mr. Miera testified affirming the 
recommendations and opinions of Ms. VanCura. He further 
testified that in light of the physical restrictions caused by 
the industrial accident, coupled with the other employability 
factors, Mr. Hoskings is not a viable candidate for job placement 
in the real world competitive job market. (R. 495-499) 
B. Intracorp. 
After Mr. Miera's report to the administrative law judge, 
Salt Lake City responded by having Mr. Hoskings evaluated by Jim 
R. Floyd, M.A., C.R.C., by title a "Rehabilitation Specialist" 
with a company named "Intracorp". Mr. Floyd prepared a written 
report dated December 24, 1993. (R. 232-238). 
An analysis of the report provides the following limitations 
among others in its use as evidence in this case: 
1. No evidence of Mr. Floyd's credentials as an expert 
were presented. His opinions are therefore without foundation 
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and incompetent. 
2. There is no indication that Mr. Floyd conducted any 
testing of Mr. Hoskings. Only an intake interview was conducted 
on December 22, 1993. He spent other parts of the day reviewing 
whatever record5 Salt Lake City chose to give him and setting up 
a computerized search of transferrable skills. (R. 233-234) 
3. Mr. Floyd did not review the extensive testing and 
analysis done by the Division of Rehabilitative Services as 
testified to by Mr. Miera though he asked Salt Lake City to 
provide that information to him. (R. 234). He had no means of 
evaluating Mr. Hoskings endurance, pain threshold etc. in 
performing the physical and mental requirements for any job. 
4. Nowhere in his report does Mr. Floyd opine that Mr. 
Hoskings is capable of returning to his former job as a fire 
fighter. 
5. Mr. Floyd did not have the opportunity to discover and 
evaluate Mr. Hoskings' propensity to not complain about his 
significant physical discomfort as did Ms. VanCura. He had no 
opportunity to understand Mr. Hoskings' symptoms as they relate 
to reasonable job placement. 
6. He made no direct contact with potential employers to 
see if there truly is a job available for a man with Mr. 
Hoskings' limitations. 
5
. Neither Salt Lake City nor Mr. Floyd ever identified 
what records he reviewed for his analysis. Since he was never 
presented as a witness, there was no opportunity for cross 
examination to find out what he reviewed. 
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7. Though Floyd mentions "job availability" as a screening 
factor, he fails to define the term. (R. 236-237) 
8. There is no precise job description provided for any 
job Floyd asserts is available. There is no discussion of the 
actual physical activity etc. required in a real job as opposed 
to the general job classification. 
As an example of the substantive failings of the report, Mr. 
Floyd suggests at page 6 there may be jobs available to Mr. 
Hoskings as a Fire Marshal. However, he makes only a surmise and 
did no investigation as to whether such specialty jobs are 
anywhere availability. Mr. Floyd does concede that the "medium" 
strength requirements of "some [such] employment settings" is a 
"caution" in placing Mr. Hoskings in such a job. (R. 237-238) 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED THE 
STANDARDS OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT OF 
UTAH REGARDING WARREN HOSKINGS7 ENTITLEMENT 
TO PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION 
BASED ON WELL ESTABLISHED UTAH APPELLATE CASE 
AUTHORITY. THERE ARE NO SPECIAL AND 
IMPORTANT REASONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE 
WRIT AS PETITIONED BY SALT LAKE CITY. 
POINT 1 
BY UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE, WARREN HOSKINGS 
CAN NO LONGER PERFORM THE DUTIES OF HIS LIFE 
LONG PROFESSION AS A FIRE FIGHTER AND HAS 
BEEN FOUND UNABLE TO BE REHABILITATED INTO 
ANY REGULAR, STEADY EMPLOYMENT IN THE 
COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET BY THE DEPARTMENT OF 
REHABILITATIVE SERVICES AND IS THEREFORE AN 
"ODD-LOT" WORKER. 
Warren Hoskings is permanently and totally disabled as a 
result in whole or in part from an ankle injury he suffered on 
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April 6, 1986, while employed as a fire fighter by Salt Lake City 
Corporation. His physical impairment, symptoms of pain which 
limit function, age, work experience, potential for 
rehabilitation to meaningful work etc. make him an "odd-lot" 
person: 
Some employees, however, cannot be 
rehabilitated and although not in a state of 
abject helplessness, 'can no longer perform 
the duties . . . required in [their] 
occupation [s] . ' (citation omitted) . These 
employees fall into the so-called 'odd-lot' 
category. 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 
1984) at 212 (Emphasis added) 
There is no evidence and no contention made by Salt Lake 
City or the Industrial Commission that Mr. Hoskings can perform 
the duties of a fire fighter. 
The Commission through its administrative law judge as 
required by §35-1-67 U.C.A. referred the case to the Division of 
Rehabilitative Services. The Division reported to the 
administrative law judge that Mr. Hoskings had fully cooperated 
and that due to his impairments and other employability factors, 
he was not a candidate for rehabilitation. At that stage, the 
burden shifted to Salt Lake City to demonstrate that regular full 
time employment is available to Mr. Hoskings notwithstanding his 
limitations. 
The presence of substantial pain may 
logically cause an injured worker to fall 
into this odd-lot category, inasmuch as it 
directly affects the probable dependability 
with which the injured worker can sell his 
services in a competitive labor market, 
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undistorted by such factors as business 
booms, sympathy of a particular employer or 
friends, temporary luck, or the super human 
efforts of the claimant to rise above his 
crippling handicaps, (citations omitted) . . 
• Only where the employee returns to work 
under normal conditions will the presumption 
of no loss of earning capacity stay 
unassailed. (citation omitted). . . 
Norton v. Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986) at 
1028 (Emphasis added) 
In response to the Division's assessment, Salt Lake City 
retained the services of Intracorp. As pointed out in the 
Statement of Facts and by the Court of Appeals, the foundation is 
totally lacking for the employability opinions expressed in the 
report. Salt Lake City did no more through the Intracorp. report 
than to allege that there are some limited occupations available 
without providing any substance to the allegation. 
It is not enough in such a case to allege 
that work is available; it must be shown that 
there is regular, dependable work available 
for the plaintiff, without the expectation 
that he will rely on the sympathy of friends 
or his own 'superhuman efforts'' (citation 
omitted) 
Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management and Second Injury 
Fund, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986) at 1327 (Emphasis added) 
POINT 2 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND WARREN 
HOSKINGS' EARLY RETIREMENT IS NOT A FACTOR IN 
THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR NOT HE IS 
ENTITLED TO PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY• 
The Court of appeals recognized a principle that the 
Industrial Commission and Salt Lake City refuse to recognize: 
...to facilitate the purposes of the 
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legislation, the Workers Compensation Act is 
to be liberally construed and any doubt as to 
compensation is to be resolved in favor of 
the applicant (citations omitted. 
USX Corporation vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 781 P.2d 883 
(Utah App. 1989) at 886. 
Salt Lake City argues that Warren Hoskings "..voluntarily 
removed himself from City employment and the job market..." and 
"[i]t is unconscionable to use the workers' compensation laws to 
force the public treasury to pay, as an afterthought, $85,800.00 
for an ankle injury, years after the employee has retired..." 
The City also claims it should at least receive a credit against 
the workers' compensation benefits for the amount Mr. Hoskings 
receives in retirement benefits. Those arguments are absurd and 
contrary to the uncontroverted evidence in this case. Workers' 
compensation law does not support such arguments. 
The City cites the case of Peck vs. Eimco, 748 P.2d 572 
(Utah 1987) in support of its claim6. A fair reading of Peck 
leads to but one conclusion, the Court of Appeals was correct in 
its determination herein. The Peck facts are remarkably similar 
to the case at bar regarding continuing to work after an injury 
and then taking a retirement earned by many faithful years of 
service to the employer: 
In Norton7, we held that the fact that 
the claimant returned to work and continued 
to work for six years following his 
6
. The case in its entirety is attached as Appendix 5 for 
the convenience of the Court. 
7
. Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986) 
at 1028. 
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industrial accident "did not automatically 
disqualify him from receiving permanent total 
disability benefits, where the facts 
indicate [d] that throughout the remainder of 
his employment he was not restored to 
health." Id. (Citations omitted.)... 
...Eimco next contends... that Peck "just 
plain retired"...(footnote omitted) In 
Marshall8, however, we held that the 
determination whether to award permanent 
total disability benefits must focus on the 
decline in claimant's wage-earning capacity 
and not on the claimant's eligibility to 
retire. 681 P.2d at 213. The mere fact that 
an employee has retired will not adversely 
affect a determination of permanent total 
disability when the employee has demonstrated 
that his disability from the industrial 
injury significantly influenced [that 
decision]. (Citations omitted.) 
748 P.2d at 577-578 
The unrebutted evidence is contrary to Salt Lake City's 
assertions that Mr. Hoskings' injury was not a significant 
influence on his retirement and his inability to be a fire 
fighter. The City had direct knowledge of the continuing severe 
problems he was having with his ankle injury. It sent him to 
doctor after doctor in an attempt to resolve the worsening 
problems. The doctors the City sent him to unanimously reported 
at various times that he could not perform fire fighting duties. 
It is contrary to reason for the City to deny that knowledge. 
The Court of Appeals was left with but one conclusion--the 
same conclusion this Court reached in Peck:9 
8
. Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984) 
9
. The Peck Court was citing approvingly from Marshall, 
supra. 
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He presented uncontroverted evidence of 
his impairment, his inability to perform the 
work required by his job and the opinion of 
the division of vocational rehabilitation 
that he could not be rehabilitated. He also 
testified that prior to his injury he had 
fully intended to work rather than to retire. 
681 P.2d at 213 
...Eimco relied only on the facts that 
Peck returned to work following his injury 
and then retired ten months later. Thus, 
Eimco failed to show any reasonable wage-
earning capacity which rebutted Peck's prima 
facie entitlement to permanent total 
disability benefits. 
748 P.2d at 578-579. 
POINT 3 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
THERE WAS NOT A RESIDUUM OF COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE 
INTRACORP. REPORT REGARDING REHABILITATION 
AND JOB AVAILABILITY IN THE REAL WORLD 
COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET. (291 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 18-19) 
The Court of Appeals statement of the "residuum rule" 
comports with this Court's and the Court of Appeals' prior 
opinions that a finding cannot be based on hearsay or other 
incompetent evidence alone. See for example Garfield Smelting 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 53 Utah 133, 178 P. 57 (1918); 
Industrial Power Contractors v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
832 P.2d 477 (Utah App. 1992). 
Salt Lake City argues it has satisfied the residuum 
requirement because: 
1. Hoskings did not miss work until his retirement; 
2. Hoskings elected to take advantage of an early 
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retirement incentive program; 
3. Hoskings worked a unique specialty light duty job as a 
seasonal fire marshal in Yellowstone Park for two seasons; 
(See Salt Lake City's Brief at pages 11-14.) 
As argued elsewhere, none of those factors is sufficient to 
take Mr. Hoskings from the "odd-lot" category. Further, none of 
those factors supports the conclusory unsubstantiated opinions 
regarding real world job availability expressed in the Intracorp. 
report. 
We have but to look at Salt Lake City's cornerstone case to 
find the fallacy of its arguments. The Peck Court placed 
emphasis on the primary treatise on workmen's compensation law: 
Professor Larson states: 
"Total disability" in compensation law 
is not to be interpreted literally as utter 
and abject helplessness. Evidence that 
claimant has been able to earn occasional 
wages or perform certain kinds of gainful 
work does not necessarily rule out a finding 
of total disability nor require that it be 
reduced to partial. 
...The essence of the test is the 
probable dependability with which a claimant 
can sell his services in a competitive labor 
market, undistorted by such factors as 
business booms, sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or 
the superhuman efforts of the claimant to 
rise above his crippling handicaps. 
2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation Section 57.51(a), at 10-164.65, 
10-164.84(18) (1987) (footnotes omitted) 
748 P.2d at 575 (Emphasis added.) 
The only non-hearsay evidence regarding rehabilitation and 
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job availability is that presented by the DRS through witness 
Frank Miera. 
At Point III of its brief, Salt Lake City asserts that the 
Court of Appeals reweighed the evidence. That is not the case. 
Rather, the Court of Appeals looked at the record and found no 
independent competent evidence to support the conclusions of the 
Intracorp. report. 
Salt Lake City makes another disingenuous argument at Point 
V in its brief that Mr. Hoskings' "occupation is retirement" and 
that the Court of Appeals is making the City an employment agency 
to find Mr. Hoskings a "second job". To the contrary, the Court 
of Appeals merely enunciated the burden placed on the City by 
this Court's prior decisions cited hereinbefore. Intracorp. did 
not identify even one specific job available to Warren Hoskings. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals decision herein does not raise any 
issues the Supreme Court has not already considered in its prior 
opinions regarding the standards: (1) for finding permanent 
total disability in the workers' compensation context; (2) the 
burden shifting effect of the "odd-lot" doctrine; and (3) the 
principle that an administrative agency cannot base a finding on 
hearsay evidence alone and that a "residuum" of legally competent 
substantive evidence independent of the hearsay must support the 
finding. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is in no respect 
contrary to prior Utah Supreme Court decisions. It merely 
applies them to this case. There are no other important reasons 
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as provided in Rule 46 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure that 
justify issuance of the writ as petitioned by Salt Lake City. 
DATED this £Z% day of August, 19 96. 
JAMES R. BLACK AND ASSOCIATES 
Uu.44 
ijarn^s R. Black 
>rneys f o r Warren Hoskings 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Warren HOSKINGS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah and 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 
Respondents. 
No. 950236-CA 
FILED: May 31, 1996 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
ATTORNEYS: 
James R. Black, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner 
Alan L. Hennebold, Frank Nakamura, and 
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondents 
Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Billings. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
ORME, Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Warren Hoskings seeks review of 
an Industrial Commission order that overturned 
an administrative law judge's decision granting 
him permanent total disability benefits. We 
reverse the Commission's order and remand 
with instructions to reinstate the administrative 
law judge's decision. 
FACTS 
We recite the facts as found by the 
Commission.1 In 1966, Hoskings began work as 
a fireman for Salt Lake City Corporation. He 
was promoted to lieutenant in 1974, and then to 
captain in the early 1980's. 
In 1980, Hoskings injured his left ankle while 
fighting a fire. As a result of this injury, he 
underwent surgery but continued to experience 
pain. In April 1986, Hoskings reinjuredhis left 
ankle in the course of his employment. The next 
day, he sought medical attention and was 
diagnosed with an acute left ankle sprain and 
calcaneous/cuboid joint problem. He was later 
diagnosed with the additional condition of 
traumatic osteoarthritis. 
Hoskings did not miss any time from work as 
a result of this injury. However, after the injury, 
he experienced chronic pain and difficulty in 
walking. Various physicians examined him and 
attempted to treat his injuries with conservative 
remedies. However, none of these treatments 
produced any significant improvement in 
Hoskings's left ankle. 
In 1988, Hoskings took early retirement from 
Salt Lake City Corporation, apparently to take 
advantage of an attractive early retirement 
package. At the time of his retirement, Hoskings 
did not inform Salt Lake City Corporation that 
his decision to retire was related in any manner 
to his left ankle injury. However, he testified 
before an administrative law judge in this 
proceeding that his injury did contribute to his 
decision to retire early. There is no evidence 
that his work performance was unsatisfactory 
prior to his retirement. 
During the summers of 1990 and 1991, after 
his retirement, Hoskings worked for Hamilton 
Stores as a fire marshall in Yellowstone National 
Park. A significant portion of his work day 
consisted of driving in a vehicle from one store 
to another, making inspections and teaching fire 
safety procedures. Hoskings reported no 
difficulties in performing the duties of this job. 
However, when the job was changed to a 
year-round position, he chose to resign because 
he believed the cold winter temperatures might 
aggravate his ankle pain. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
PROCEEDINGS 
In 1990, Hoskings filed an Application for 
Hearing with the Industrial Commission. In his 
Application for Hearing, he claimed that Salt 
Lake City Corporation had refused to pay him 
medical expenses, temporary total disability 
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, 
and permanent total disability benefits due him 
by reason of his ankle injury. An evidentiary 
hearing before an administrative law judge was 
held on January 8, 1992. After the hearing, the 
ALJ referred the matter to a medical panel. The 
medical panel found that Hoskings's foremost 
orthopedic problem was the calcaneus/cuboid 
arthritis of his left ankle. The medical panel 
opined that the origin of this problem was 
definitely industrial and that it had worsened 
since the 1986 industrial accident. 
The ALJ then made a tentative finding of 
permanent total disability and, as required by 
statute, referred the case to the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services (DRS) for an evaluation 
of Hoskings's susceptibility to rehabilitation.2 
According to the testimony of Frank Miera, the 
rehabilitation counselor assigned to evaluate 
Hoskings's case, DRS performed a one-week 
work evaluation during November 1992. Mr. 
Miera testified that Hoskings fully cooperated 
with the DRS during the evaluation and was 
very truthful and honest about his condition 
throughout the process. The evaluation was 
conducted by DRS rehabilitation counselors 
trained to administer such evaluations. Mr. 
Miera testified that in the regular course of his 
work as a DRS rehabilitation counselor, he 
refers applicants to trained DRS personnel and 
relies on their written reports in assessing an 
applicant's potential for rehabilitation. After the 
evaluation, Mr. Miera requested Hoskings to 
update him periodically on his condition Mr. 
Miera testified that Hoskings did update him on 
his condition and reported that he was having 
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the same problems with his left ankle. Mr. 
Miera concluded that it was not feasible for 
Hoskings to enter into a rehabilitation program. 
Salt Lake City Corporation then requested that 
Hoskings undergo a vocational evaluation to be 
performed by Intracorp, a private rehabilitation 
firm, which evaluation was completed during 
December 1993. Salt Lake City Corporation 
submitted the Intracorp report to the ALL 
The Intracorp report concluded that Hoskings 
could be rehabilitated. The Intracorp evaluator, 
Jim Floyd, found that Hoskings demonstrated 
the capacity to learn and would be successful in 
formal training to prepare for more challenging 
and higher paying jobs. In his report, Mr. Floyd 
noted that Hoskings had improved physical 
stamina and that DRS's finding of poor physical 
stamina was no longer accurate. In addition, Mr. 
Floyd identified several jobs that Hoskings 
would qualify for given some limited training or 
schooling. Finally, the Intracorp report identified 
the regions of Utah that would provide the 
greatest opportunity for employment in the 
identified jobs. 
After receiving the^ DRS letter, Miera's 
testimony, and the Intracorp report, the ALJ 
entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order. Applying the "odd lot" 
doctrine, the ALJ first found that Hoskings had 
met his burden of proving that the 1986 
industrial accident caused his ankle injury and 
that he could not return to work as a fire 
fighter. Next, the ALJ found that Hoskings met 
his burden of proving he could not be 
rehabilitated. The ALJ then concluded that Salt 
Lake City Corporation had not met its burden to 
show that regular steady work was nonetheless 
available to Hoskings. Accordingly, the ALJ 
held that Hoskings was entitled to an award of 
permanent total disability benefits. 
Salt Lake City Corporation filed a Motion for 
Review with the Commission. The Commission 
reversed the ALJ's decision and held that 
Hoskings was not entitled to permanent total 
disability benefits. In reaching its decision, the 
Commission found that Hoskings could be 
rehabilitated and that regular, dependable 
employment was available to him in other 
branches of the labor market. 
On appeal, Hoskings argues that the 
Commission misinterpreted the "odd lot" 
doctrine by failing to apply the correct burdens 
of proof to the evidence introduced by the 
parties. In addition, he argues that the 
Commission's findings are not supported by 
competent legal evidence. Before turning to the 
specific claims, we review the legal principles 
applicable to this case, i.e., the "odd lot" 
doctrine and the residuum rule. 
"ODD LOT" DOCTRINE 
Under the "odd lot" doctrine,3 the Commission 
may find permanent total disability when a 
relatively small percentage of impairment caused 
by an industrial accident is combined with other 
factors to render the claimant unable to obtain 
v. Rep. 17 Provo, Utah 
suitable employment. See Hardman v. Salt Lake 
City Fleet Mgmt., 125 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 
1986);Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 
208, 212 (Utah 1984). A finding of permanent 
total disability under the odd lot doctrine 
requires the following: (1) the employee must 
prove that he or she cannot perform the duties 
required in his or her occupation; (2) after being 
referred to the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services by the Industrial Commission, the 
employee, with the assistance of the DRS, must 
prove that he or she cannot be rehabilitated; (3) 
if the employee meets the first two 
requirements, the burden then shifts to the 
employer to prove the existence of regular, 
steady work the employee can nonetheless 
perform, taking into account such factors as the 
employee's age, mental capacity, and education. 
Hardman, 125 P.2d at 1326-27. 
In meeting its burden, it is insufficient for the 
employer to simply show that the employee is 
generally capable of performing some type of 
work. Rather, in order to prove the existence of 
regular and steady work the employee can 
perform, the employer must prove that "regular, 
dependable work [is] available1" to the 
employee. Marshall, 681 P.2d at 212 (emphasis 
added). This requires the employer to introduce 
evidence of "an actual job within a reasonable 
distance from [the employee's] home which he 
is able to perform or for which he can be 
trained." Lyons v. Industrial Special Indent. 
Fund, 565 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Idaho 1977) 
(construing Idaho statute). See ARA Servs., Inc. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 590 N.E.2d 78, 83-84 
(HI. App. 1992) (holding burden shifts to 
employer to show some kind of suitable work is 
available to claimant); Durbin v. State Farm 
Fire & Cos. Co., 558 So. 2d 1257, 1260 (La. 
App. 1990) (requiring employer to prove some 
form of gainful occupation is regularly and 
continuously available to employee within 
reasonable proximity of his residence). 
Moreover, the employer must also show that the 
employee "has a reasonable opportunity to be 
employed at that job." Lyons, 565 P.2d at 
1364.4 
RESIDUUM RULE 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-88 (1994) provides that 
"[n]either the Commission nor its hearing 
examiner shall be bound by the usual 
common-law or statutory rules of evidence." 
Therefore, hearsay evidence, even if objected to, 
is admissible in an administrative hearing before 
the Commission. Industrial Power Contractors 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 832 P.2d 477, 478 (Utah 
App. 1992). However, the Commission's 
findings of fact "cannot be based exclusively on 
hearsay evidence." Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor 
Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 
1984) (emphasis in original). To support the 
Commission's findings, "there must be a 
residuum of evidence, legal and competent in a 
court of law." Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 
11 Utah 2d 312. 315. 358 P.2d 899. 901 
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(1961). [ 
The residuum rule requires that each finding 
of fact made by an administrative agency be i 
supported by a residuum of legally competent 
evidence. See Yacht Club, 681 P.2d at 1227; . 
Industrial Power, 832 P.2d at 479; Wagstaffv. 
Department ofEmployment Sec, 826 P.2d 1069, 
1072 (Utah App. 1992); Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32-33 (Utah ! 
App. 1991). For example, in Wagstaff, a former 
Air Force civilian employee, discharged for 
drug use, challenged a decision of the Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission denying 
him unemployment compensation benefits. The 
employee claimed that since the Air Force 
disciplinary regulations in effect at the time of 
his drug use did not sanction discharge for 
first-time drug offenders, he was not terminated 
for just cause. 826 P.2d at 1070-71. 
In evaluating whether the employee was 
discharged for just cause, the Commission made 
a factual finding that he had used cocaine during 
his lunch break on one occasion. Id. at 1072. 
The Commission based its finding on an internal 
Air Force investigation report, as well as on the 
employee's own admission in testimony to the 
one-time drug use. Id. at 1071. The report 
contained the employee's admission to the 
one-time drug use, obtained in the course of 
investigation, as well as his co-workers9 
statements concerning the incident. Id. 
However, the report also contained statements 
from co-workers regarding the employee's drug 
use on other occasions. Id. In finding that the 
employee had engaged in drug use on one 
occasion, the Commission also made reference 
to the fact that the majority of the Board was not 
entirely persuaded that he had used drugs only 
on the one occasion. Id. at 1072 n.3. 
This court held that the Commission's finding 
of a single incident of drug use was supported 
by the employee's own admissions, and thus was 
supported by a residuum of competent, 
non-hearsay evidence. Id. at 1072. See Utah R. 
Evid. 801(d)(2). However, although no actual 
finding of additional drug use was made by the 
Commission, this court was concerned that even 
the subtle reference to additional drug use 
contained in the Commission's written opinion, 
which could only be supported by the 
co-workers' hearsay statements not buttressed by 
a residuum of competent legal evidence, tainted 
its decision. Id. Therefore, in reviewing whether 
the employee's termination was for just cause, 
we evaluated the Board's decision solely with 
reference to the employee's single admitted 
instance of drug use. Id. 
Similarly, in this case, we must determine 
whether the Commission's findings of fact 
regarding rehabilitation and job availability are 
supported by a residuum of competent, 
non-hearsay evidence. If the Commission's 
findings of fact are not supported by a residuum 
of such evidence, Hoskings is entitled to 
appropriate relief. 
rial Commission
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ANALYSIS 
Under the odd lot doctrine, as explained 
above, the employee has the initial burden to 
prove he or she cannot perform the duties 
required in his or her occupation and that he or 
she cannot be rehabilitated. If the employee fails 
in meeting these burdens, the employer's burden 
to prove the existence of actual work the 
employee can perform is not triggered and we 
need not evaluate whether that burden was 
actually met. 
In its order, the Commission reversed the 
ALTs decision and found that Hoskings could 
be rehabilitated. Therefore, we first review the 
Commission's finding regarding Hoskings's 
potential for rehabilitation. 
A. Rehabilitation 
In finding that Hoskings could be 
rehabilitated, the Commission relied on the 
conclusion to that effect in the Intracorp report. 
However, this report clearly meets the definition 
of hearsay under Rule 801, Utah Rules of 
Evidence.6 The author of the report, Jim Floyd, 
never testified at a hearing before the ALJ or the 
Commission. Therefore, although the mtracorp 
report was admissible in the Commission's 
proceedings, it could not form the sole basis for 
the Commission's factual finding regarding 
Hoskings's potential for rehabilitation. 
Consequently, the Commission's factual finding 
that Hoskings could be rehabilitated cannot be 
sustained unless there is some other, 
non-hearsay evidence to support it. 
In its order, the Commission stated that 
"Intracorp's conclusion [regarding rehabilitation] 
is corroborated by the fact that Hoskings found 
other work at Hamilton Stores and successfully 
performed his employment duties there." Salt 
Lake City Corporation argues that this fact 
supports the Commission's decision and 
provides the requisite residuum of competent 
legal evidence. However, this fact is essentially 
irrelevant to the issue of whether Hoskings could 
be rehabilitated into a well-known branch of the 
labor market. 
Hoskings testified at the evidentiary hearing 
that Hamilton Stores was seeking someone to 
work year round, including the winter months. 
Hoskings testified he was unable to work during 
the winter months because he could not stand 
the pain in his foot and ankle caused by the cold 
weather. Salt Lake City Corporation presented 
no contradicting e\ aence on this point. The 
mere fact that Hoskings was able to work for a 
few months during the summers of 1990 and 
1991 as a fire marshal! in Yellowstone National 
Park, hundreds of miles from Salt Lake City and 
his permanent residences in Ivins and Vernal, 
Utah, does not support a finding that he can be 
successfully rehabilitated into any well-known 
branch of the labor market.7 
Although we base our decision regarding 
rehabilitation on the residuum rule, which the 
parties have addressed in their briefs, there is an 
additional basis on which our decision could be 
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premised. The applicable law regarding 
permanent total disability at the time of 
Hoskings's April 16, 1986, injury read, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
If the employee has tentatively been found 
to be permanently and totally disabled, it 
shall be mandatory that the industrial 
commission of Utah refer the employee to 
the [Division of Rehabilitation Services] for 
rehabilitation training . . . . If the division 
. . . certifies to the industrial commission of 
Utah in writing that the employee has fully 
cooperated with the division . . . in its 
efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the 
opinion of the division the employee may 
not be rehabilitated, the commission shall 
order that there be paid to the employee 
weekly benefits . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (1974)(repealed 1988 
Utah Laws, ch.116, §4) (emphasis added). A 
plain reading of this statute suggests the 
determination of rehabilitation is vested in DRS, 
with no discretion left with the Commission to 
revisit the question and decide it anew. 
Therefore, it would appear that once DRS 
certified to the Commission in writing that 
Hoskings could not be rehabilitated, all inquiry 
into the issue of rehabilitation—a question 
delegated by the Legislature not to the 
Commission, but to DRS-should have ended. 
As we read the statute, the Commission was 
unable to revisit the issue of rehabilitation or to 
consider other evidence, such as the Intracorp 
report presented by Salt Lake City Corporation.8 
B. Job Availability 
Once it is determined that an employee cannot 
be rehabilitated—and such is the conclusion that 
must be drawn about Hoskings on the record 
before us—the burden then shifts to the employer 
to prove, notwithstanding the employee's general 
inability to be rehabilitated, the "existence of 
regular, steady work the employee can perform, 
taking into account such factors as the 
employee's age, mental capacity and education." 
Hardman v. Salt Lake Oty Fleet Mgmt.y 125 
P.2d 1323, 1326-27 (Utah 1977). However, as 
indicated above, the employer must introduce 
evidence of "an actual job within a reasonable 
distance from [the employee's] home which he 
is able to perform or for which he can be 
trained." Lyons v. Industrial Special Indent. 
Fund, 565 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Idaho 1977). In 
addition, the employer must also show that the 
employee "has a reasonable opportunity to be 
employed at that job." Id. 
In this case, the Commission relied exclusively 
on the Intracorp report to find that regular, 
dependable work was available to Hoskings. 
However, and totally aside from residuum rule 
concerns, a review of the substance of the 
Intracorp report reveals that it fails to prove that 
an actual job was available to Hoskings. 
Moreover, the Intracorp report fails to provide 
any analysis regarding whether or not Hoskings 
had a reasonable opportunity to be employed at 
any particular job, due regard being had for his 
age, mental capacity, and education. 
In assessing Hoskings's employ ability, Mr. 
Floyd, the author of the Intracorp report, ran 
three computer searches and two manual 
searches. In the first computer search, for 
occupations with skills that are directly 
transferrable from those of a firefighter, only 
one occupation emerged: surveillance-system 
monitor. The second computer search revealed 
three occupations that Hoskings could allegedly 
perform given some limited schooling or short 
term training. Finally, a third computer search 
was conducted which considered less closely 
related occupations using the same tools and 
machinery that Hoskings had used in his 
previous jobs. Two job titles emerged from this 
final computer search. 
After the computer searches were finished, the 
report indicates that two manual searches were 
conducted. The first search considered 
Hoskings's entire work history, including his 
military experience. In this search, three 
occupations emerged. Finally, using the Utah 
Department of Employment Security publication, 
"Occupations in Demand," for the period of 
January-June, 1993, four job titles were 
identified. 
Although the searches contained in the report 
identified several job titles that existed in the 
Wasatch Front region, no evidence shows that 
these jobs were actually available to Hoskings. 
First, nowhere in the report is there a 
meaningful discussion of the duties required in 
the occupations described. The report lacks any 
analysis of whether Hoskings could actually 
perform the duties required in these occupations 
given his disabilities. Furthermore, the report 
fails to show that these particular occupations 
are actually available, i.e., that the demand for 
such jobs has not been fully met by the 
workforce. Moreover, no evidence is contained 
in the report that would indicate Hoskings 
himself had a reasonable opportunity to be 
employed in these jobs, i.e., assuming some of 
these positions are available in general, what is 
the realistic prospect that an employer will 
choose a man in his mid-fifties with a bad ankle 
and other health problems to fill one of them? 
Although the report claims to have considered 
"job availability" in the computer searches, no 
discussion as to what is meant by this term is 
contained in the report. In describing the second 
manual search, the report alleges that the four 
occupations found are "reasonably available in 
southwestern or northeastern regions of Utah." 
However, the report contains no evidence that 
these particular jobs are actually available to a 
person with the same disabilities as Hoskings. It 
is insufficient for Salt Lake City Corporation to 
allege that a particular occupation is generally 
available to the public at large, without 
providing further evidence that the particular 
occupation is actually available to Hoskings. In 
other words, in order to sustain its burden under 
the odd lot doctrine, an employer must prove 
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that an actual job is regularly and continuously 
available to the applicant, within a reasonable 
proximity of his or her usual residence or 
residences, and that the applicant has a 
reasonable opportunity to be employed in the 
particular job. 
Although we conclude that Salt Lake City 
Corporation failed in a more general way to 
meet its burden in this regard under the odd lot 
doctrine, we also conclude that the 
Commission's finding as to job availability was, 
at a more technical level, not based on a 
residuum of competent legal evidence. 
The Commission based its finding that other 
work was available to Hoskings exclusively on 
the Intracorp report. However, as we indicated 
above, the Intracorp report is hearsay. Thus, 
although this report was admissible during the 
administrative proceedings held before the 
Commission, it cannot be the sole basis for the 
Commission's finding. Rather, the Commission 
must base its findings on legally competent 
evidence—a finding cannot be based solely on 
hearsay. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the statute regarding permanent 
total disability in effect at the time of Hoskings's 
injury, it may have been improper for the 
Commission to consider the Intracorp report on 
the issue of rehabilitation. If not, the 
Commission nonetheless erred, given the 
residuum rule, in finding that Hoskings could be 
rehabilitated. Further, Salt Lake City | 
Corporation failed to sustain its burden under 
the odd lot doctrine to prove the existence of a 
regular, steady job that was actually available to 
Hoskings. Alternatively, in light of the residuum 
rule, the Commission erred in finding that Salt 
Lake City Corporation had met this burden. 
Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's 
order and remand with instructions to reinstate 
the administrative law judge's decision. 
Gregory K. Orme, Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge j 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
1. Although an administrative law judge initially hears 
the evidence, the Commission is the ultimate fact 
finder. Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 
1287 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. The applicable law regarding permanent total 
disability, in effect at the time of Hoskings's second 
injury, read, in pertinent part, as follows: 
If the employee has tentatively been found to be 
permanently and totally disabled, it shall be 
mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah 
refer the employee to the division of vocational 
rehabilitation [since renamed the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services] under the state board of 
education for rehabilitation training . . . . If the 
division of vocational rehabilitation . . . certifies 
to the industrial commission of Utah in writing 
that the employee has fully cooperated with the 
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division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts 
to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the 
division the employee may not be rehabilitated, 
the commission shall order that there be paid to 
the employee weekly benefits . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (1974)(repealed 1988 Utah 
Laws, ch.116, §4). 
3. The term "odd lot" was first used by Judge 
Moulton in the case of Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, 1 K.B. 
1009(1911): 
[T]here are cases in which the onus of sh[o]wing 
that suitable work can in fact be obtained does 
fall upon the employer who claims that the 
incapacity of the workman is only partial. If the 
accident has left the workman so injured that he 
is incapable of becoming an ordinary workman of 
average capacity in any well known branch of the 
labour market-if in other words the capacities for 
work left to him fit him only for special uses and 
do not, so to speak, make his powers of labour a 
merchantable article in some of the well known 
lines of the labour market, I think it is incumbent 
upon the employer to sh[o]w that such special 
employment can in fact be obtained by him. If I 
might be allowed to use such an undignified 
phrase, I should say that if the accident leaves the 
workman's labour in the position of an "odd lot" 
in the labour market, the employer must sh[o]w 
that a customer can be found who will take it. 
Id. at 1020-21 (quoted in 1C Arthur Larson & Lex K. 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 
§57.51(b), at 10-330 (1995)). 
4. After his retirement, Hoskings moved from Salt 
Lake City, Utah. He now has homes in Ivins and 
Vernal, Utah. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated, 
"[a] claimant should not be permitted to achieve 
permanent disability by changing his place of 
residence." Lyons, 565 P.2d at 1364 n.3. Therefore, 
in this case, in considering whether Salt Lake City 
Corporation met its burden, evidence of job 
availability in Salt Lake City, Ivins, and Vernal, Utah, 
would all be germane. See id. 
5. The first prong of the odd lot doctrine, whether the 
employee can perform the duties required in his or her 
occupation, is not at issue in this appeal. 
6. Utah R. Evid. 801 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or 
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a 
person, if it is intended by the person as an 
assertion. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay* is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
7. One of the motives behind the "odd lot" doctrine is 
a desire to encourage efforts by a claimant to 
rehabilitate himself. See 1C Arthur Larson & Lex K. 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 
§57.51(f),at 10-357 to-359 (1995). Therefore, courts 
are careful to avoid penalizing or discouraging a 
claimant from attempting to rehabilitate himself in 
some type of special work setting. Id. See also note 4. 
8. To the extent this interpretation raises a possible 
due process concern, as suggested by Salt Lake City 
Corporation at oral argument, we note that the 
Legislature has amended this statute to allow for a 
mandatory hearing regarding the issue of 
rehabilitation. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (1994) 
currently reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
*CE REPORTS 
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(6)(a) A finding by the commission of permanent 1 
total disability is not final, unless otherwise I 
agreed to by the parties, until: 
(iii) the commission, after notice to the 
parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise 
stipulated, to consider evidence regarding 1 
rehabilitation and to review any 
reemployment plan submitted by the 
employer or its insurance carrier under 
Subsection (6)(a)(i i) . . . . 
9. Of course, the employer does not become an 
employment agency for the applicant. The employer 
is not required to find a particular position for an 
applicant, much less arrange for an interview. Rather, 
tfeft esa$to$«t iou& <wl^  $tQv^ that aik acftial yah doe& I 
exist in the usual residence or residences of the 
applicant and that he or she has a reasonable 
opportunity to be employed in that job. 
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ORME, Presiding Judge: 
Robert Pendleton appeals the trial court's 
denial of his petition to terminate alimony based 
on his claim that his ex-wife is cohabitating with 
a person of the opposite sex. We reverse. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Robert Pendleton and Joyce Pendleton were 
divorced in March 1991. Joyce was awarded 
monthly alimony. Paragraph 13 of the divorce 
decree states that Robert is to pay alimony until 
Joyce's death, remarriage, or cohabitation. The 
divorce decree provision reflects the requirement 
of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(6) (1989) that 
[a]ny order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony 
that the former spouse is residing with a 
person of the opposite sex. However, if it is 
further established by the person receiving 
alimony that that relationship or association 
is without any sexual contact, payment of 
alimony shall resume.1 
In August 1993, Robert became aware that 
Joyce had entered into a relationship with Bill. 
Suspecting Joyce and Bill were cohabiting, 
Robert filed a petition to terminate alimony in 
October 1993, ceased making alimony payments 
\ o 3tr?fcfc, and taposft&& <&b ?&sttffliy p*ytt«tfc& 
otherwise due into an escrow account pending 
the resolution of his petition. 
The trial court found that Bill was not 
"residing" with Joyce and, therefore, that 
alimony should not be terminated. The court 
concluded that "residence" required "some sort 
of duration" and because Bill's sharing of 
Joyce's residence was for a temporary period of 
time, Bill was not a resident. The court did not 
make clear why it regarded the arrangement as 
temporary, a characterization that is somewhat 
curious in view of the fact it had gone on for 
some time and was still going on as of the time 
of trial, albeit with less consistency. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether Joyce was "residing" with Bill is a 
mixed question of fact and law. Haddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669,671 (Utah 1985). While 
we defer to the trial court's factual findings 
unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, 
we review its ultimate conclusion for 
correctness. See id. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
The issue in this case is whether or not Bill 
"resided" with Joyce. "Common residency 
means the sharing of a common abode that both 
parties consider their principal domicile for 
more than a temporary or brief period of time." 
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 
1985). It implies continuity, not simply a habit 
of visiting or a sojourn. Id. at 673. In Haddow, 
the Utah Supreme Court determined that Ms. 
Haddow did not share a common residence with 
Mr. Hudson although the two spent considerable 
time together. Id. at 673-74. The Court focused 
on whether Mr. Hudson traveled freely in and 
out of Ms. Haddow's home. Id. at 673. The two 
1 determinative facts were that Mr. Hudson had 
1 no key to the house and that he did not spend 
time there when Ms. Haddow was away. The 
Court explained its focus on these facts as 
follows: 
These circumstances seem particularly 
significant on the question of whether Mr. 
Hudson was living with appellant, since a 
resident will come and go as he pleases in 
his own home, while a visitor, however 
regular and frequent, will schedule his visits 
1 to coincide with the presence of the person 
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§35-1-67 U.C.A., CUM. SUPP., REPL. VOL. 4(B), 1974 ED., PERMANENT 
TOTAL DISABILITY-AMOUNT OF PAYMENT-VOCATION REHABILITATION-
PAYMENTS AND PROCEDURES 
35-1-67 LABOR—INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-67, Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments — Vocational rehabilitation — Procedure 
and payments. 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66 2/3% of 
his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a depen-
dent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, 
up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. However, 
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance 
carrier be required to pay weekly compensation payments for more than 312 
weeks. A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings 
have been had: If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently 
and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer the employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under the 
state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of 
the commission to order paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of 
the second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed 
$1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabili-
tation and training of the employee shall generally follow the practice appli-
cable under § 35-1-69, relating to the rehabilitation of employees having com-
bined injuries. If the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state 
board of education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing 
that the employee has fully cooperated with the division of vocational rehabil-
itation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order that there be 
paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of 662/3% of his average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of 
four dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the 
employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out of the second injury fund 
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with 
the time that the payments, as in this section provided, to be made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the 
employee. No employee shall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails or 
refuses to cooperate with the division of vocational rehabilitation under this 
section. 
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to bene-
fits from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those 
injured prior to March 6,1949, shall receive not less than $120 per week when 
paid only by the second injury fund, or when combined with compensation 
payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. The division of vocational 
rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational training of the em-
ployee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is 
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ANALYSIS 
Prior accidents contributing to disability. 
Statute of limitations. 
Total disability. 
—Question of fact. 
Cited. 
Prior accidents contributing to disability. 
Employee who was permanently and totally 
disabled due to a combination of prior and 
present accidents was entitled to lifetime bene-
fits payable from the special fund provided for 
in 35-1-68. McPhie v. Industrial Comm. (Utah 
1977) 567 P 2d 153. 
Statute of limitations. 
This section governs permanent total dis-
ability claims and contains no statute of limi-
tations for such claims; therefore, where em-
ployee suffered an injury in October of 1961 
and notice of injury and claim was properly 
given and filed in accordance with require-
ments of 35-1-99 and 35-1-100, and employee 
was found to have suffered permanent partial 
disability and received 40 weeks of compensa-
tion through December of 1964 and payment of 
medical bill through 1966, employee's claim 
filed in December of 1982 for permanent total 
disability resulting from slow deterioration of 
a condition caused by 1961 injury was timely 
filed under this section and, under 35-1-78, in-
dustrial commission had continuing jurisdic-
tion to award permanent total disability com-
pensation. Mecham v. Industrial Comm. of 
Utah (Utah 1984) 692 P 2d 783. 
Total disability. 
Where an employee demonstrates that he 
can no longer perform his normal duties as a 
result of a work-related accident, and that he 
cannot be rehabilitated, the burden shifts to 
the employer to prove that suitable, steady 
work is available, considering the age, mental 
capacity, and education of the employee, in or-
der to preclude a determination of total and 
permanent disability under the odd-lot doc-
trine. Marshall v. Industrial Comm. of Utah 
(Utah 1984) 681 P 2d 208. 
For discussion of the odd-lot doctrine, see 
Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Mgt. & Sec-
ond Injury Fund, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986). 
Employee, who was almost 60, with a limited 
education and an even more limited work 
background, presented a prima facie case of 
tentative permanent total disability, where he 
suffered from headaches and dizziness after 
sustaining a skull fracture, and despite his em-
ployer's contentions that it offered various jobs 
to employee, the record was devoid of any con-
crete evidence that he was offered work of the 
general nature that he had been performing. 
Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Mgt. & Sec-
ond Injury Fund, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986). 
—Question of fact 
The question of whether an employee was 
totally and permanently disabled was one of 
fact to be decided by the commission, upon all 
of the evidence in the case. Kerans v. Indus-
trial ComnVn, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985). 
Cited in Booms v. Rapp Constr. Co., 720 
P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986). 
35-1-68. Second Injury Fund — Injury causing death — 
Burial expenses — Payments to dependents. 
(1) There is created a Second Injury Fund for the purpose of making pay-
ments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2. This fund shall succeed to all 
monies heretofore held in that fund designated as the "Special Fund" or the 
"Combined Injury Fund" and whenever reference is made elsewhere in this 
code to the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury Fund" that reference shall 
be deemed to be to the Second Injury Fund. The state treasurer shall be the 
custodian of the Second Injury Fund and the commission shall direct its distri-
bution. Reasonable administration assistance may be paid from the proceeds 
of that fund. The attorney general shall appoint a member of his staff to 
represent the Second Injury Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims 
against it. 
(2) If injury causes death within the period of six years from the date of the 
accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of 
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APPENDIX 3 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW DATED MARCH 3, 1995. 
(R. 211-215) 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
WARREN HOSKINGS, * 
* ORDER GRANTING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
vs. * 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, * 
Defendant. * Case No. 90-0401 
Salt Lake City Corporation asks The Industrial Commission of 
Utah to review an Administrative Law Judge's decision awarding 
permanent total disability compensation to Warren Hoskings under 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Beginning in 1966, Mr. Hoskings worked for Salt Lake City as 
a fireman. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1974, then captain in 
the early 1980's. 
While fighting a fire in 1980, Mr. Hoskings injured his left 
ankle. He underwent surgery, but continued to experience pain. On 
April 6, 1986, in the course of his employment, he reinjured his 
left ankle. He received medical attention the next day and was 
diagnosed with an acute ankle sprain and "calcaneus/cuboid joint 
problem," later additionally diagnosed as "traumatic 
osteoarthritis". 
Mr. Hoskings did not miss any work as a result of the April 
1986 injury. However, he experienced chronic pain and difficulty 
walking. He was examined by a number of different physicians who 
attempted various conservative remedies without producing any 
significant improvement. 
On September 1, 1988, Mr. Hoskings accepted early retirement 
from Salt Lake City. There is no indication that Mr. Hoskings' 
work performance was unsatisfactory prior to his retirement, nor is 
there any evidence Mr. Hoskings informed Salt Lake City that his 
decision to retire was related to his ankle injury. However, Mr. 
Hoskings now claims that his decision to retire was motivated by 
his ankle injury. 
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Mr. Hoskings' impairment from his ankle injury has been rated 
by several doctors in a range from 8% to 17% of the whole person. 
The doctors also agree the injury causes Mr. Hoskings significant 
pain and limits the mobility of the ankle. 
After retiring, Mr. Hoskings worked as fire marshall for 
Hamilton Stores in Yellowstone Park during the summers of 1990 and 
1991. Mr. Hoskings spent a substantial amount of his work day 
driving from one store to another. He had no difficulty performing 
the duties of the job. However, he chose to resign when the job 
was changed to a year-around position because he believed the cold 
winter temperatures in Yellowstone might aggravate his ankle injury 
as well as a nonindustrial pulmonary condition. 
At the time of his injury, Mr. Hoskings was 50 years old. He 
is of above average intelligence and performs well on vocational 
aptitude tests. He has completed a one-year technical program in 
electronics and two years of university education. He has work 
experience in electronics, as well as eight years experience with 
the National Guard in transportation and supply services. 
Two vocational rehabilitation studies have been performed on 
Mr. Hoskings. The first was conducted by the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services ("DRS") and concludes that Mr. Hoskings 
cannot be rehabilitated. The second was conducted at Salt Lake 
City's request by Intracorp and concludes that Mr. Hoskings is a 
suitable candidate for rehabilitation. The Intracorp study also 
identifies work available throughout Utah which Mr. Hoskings can 
perform. For reasons set forth below, the Industrial Commission 
finds the Intracorp report to be persuasive on the issues of Mr. 
Hoskings' suitability for rehabilitation and the availability of 
alternative work. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The ALJ has applied the correct framework in considering Mr. 
Hoskings' claim for permanent total disability compensation. 
First, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Hoskings' industrial accident 
caused the ankle injury which is now claimed to render him 
disabled. The ALJ then applied the "odd-lot" doctrine to determine 
whether Mr. Hoskings was permanently and totally disabled. 
The odd lot doctrine is a three part test. Mr. Hoskings must 
first prove that his ankle injury prevents him from returning to 
his former occupation. Then he must demonstrate that he cannot be 
rehabilitated. If Mr. Hoskings is successful in establishing these 
two factors, the burden shifts to Salt Lake City to prove that 
other work is available to Mr. Hoskings despite his injury. 
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While the Industrial Commission agrees with the analytical 
framework applied by the ALJ to Mr. Hoskings' claim, the Industrial 
Commission does not agree with the ALJ's conclusions on two points: 
First, the Industrial Commission finds that Mr. Hoskings can be 
rehabilitated. Second, the Industrial Commission finds that other 
work is available that Mr. Hoskings can perform, despite his ankle 
injury. 
On the issue of Mr. Hoskings' ability to be rehabilitated, the 
Industrial Commission has carefully reviewed the DRS report, which 
concludes that Mr. Hoskings was "unable to demonstrate the stamina 
and endurance needed to work in full-time employment." However, 
the report makes no distinction between sedentary work and more 
strenuous employment. It does not address the fact that Mr. 
Hoskings' employment at Hamilton Stores demonstrated some ability 
to work. It makes no reference to Mr. Hoskings' intelligence, 
education, adaptability, or wide range of prior work experience. 
The Industrial Commission has also reviewed the deposition of Mr. 
Miera, a rehabilitation counselor with DRS, but Mr. Miera's 
testimony adds little to support the DRS report. 
In contrast to the DRS report, the Intracorp report identifies 
Mr. Hoskings' training, experience and abilities. It specifically 
addresses the effects of Mr. Hoskings' ankle injury and other 
medical conditions. The Intracorp report then analyzes the 
foregoing factors and concludes that Mr. Hoskings can be 
rehabilitated. Intracorp's conclusion is corroborated by the fact 
that Mr. Hoskings found other work at Hamilton Stores and 
successfully performed his employment duties there. The Industrial 
Commission is persuaded by Intracorp's objective data and 
subjective analysis. 
Although Mr. Hoskings can be rehabilitated and therefore fails 
to meet the second element of the odd lot doctrine, the Industrial 
Commission will consider the third element of the odd lot doctrine. 
This third element requires Salt Lake City to show that other work 
is available to Mr. Hoskings. 
The Intracorp report contains a detailed list and discussion 
of employment opportunities within Mr. Hoskings' abilities. Such 
employment opportunities exist primarily in the Salt Lake 
metropolitan area, but also are present throughout Utah. The 
record contains no significant evidence contradicting the Intracorp 
report on this point. Consequently, the Industrial Commission 
finds that regular, dependable employment is available within Mr. 
Hoskings' abilities. 
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In summa*ry, the Industrial Commission agrees with the ALJ that 
Mr. Hoskings' industrial accident caused his ankle injury and that 
he cannot return to work as a fire fighter. However, contrary to 
the ALJ's decision, the Industrial Commission finds that Mr. 
Hoskings can be rehabilitated and that regular, dependable work is 
available^ to him in other branches of the labor market. The 
Industrial Commission therefore concludes that Mr. Hoskings is not 
entitled to permanent total disability compensation within the 
meaning of §3$-i-67 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
In light of the Industrial Commission's determination that Mr. 
Hoskings is not entitled to permanent total disability 
compensation, it is unnecessary to address Mr. Hoskings' argument 
regarding the date on which compensation should begin. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission reverses the ALJ's decision in this 
m f t t e r ?nc* kereby denies Mr. Hoskings claim for permanent total 
disability compensation. It is so ordered. 
Dated thlsJ^M^day of March, 1995. 
Commissioner 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the elate of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 30 days of the date of this 
Order. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
WARREN HOSKINGS 
PAGE FIVE 
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion 
For Review in the matter of Warren Hoskings v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, Case No. 90-0401, was mailed, first class postage 
prepaid, thisj^^day of March, 1995, to the following: 
WARREN HOSKINGS 
45 EAST 200 NORTH 
IVIN, UTAH 84123 
JAMES BLACK 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
800 KENNECOTT BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
FRANK NAKAMURA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
451 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SUITE 505 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
ERIE V. BOORMAN 
ADMINISTRATOR 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
P. 0. BOX 146611 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6611 
-Adell Butter-Mitchell 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
orders\90-0401 
GOT? 5 
Tab 4 
APPENDIX 4 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDING OF FACTS, CONCLUSION OF LAW 
DATED JUNE 30, 1994. (R. 148-170) 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 90000401 
WARREN H. HOSKINGS, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
(Self-Insured) and 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
January 8, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing 
was pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was represented by Susan Black, 
Attorney, at the time that the application for 
hearing was filed and until 1993. James Black, 
Attorney took over representation of the applicant 
in 1993. 
The defendant, Salt Lake City Corporation (Self-
Insured), was initially represented by Ray 
Montgomery, Attorney. Frank Nakamura, Attorney, 
took over representation of Salt Lake City 
Corporation in 1994. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
Erie Boorman, Attorney/Administrator. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits associated with an April 6, 1986 industrial fall. Salt 
Lake City Corporation accepted liability for this injury and paid 
medical expenses only associated with the foot and ankle injury 
that resulted. Salt Lake City Corporation has denied liability for 
permanent total disability benefits because the employer argues 
that the applicant is not totally disabled, and if he is, his 
disability is related to conditions unrelated to the left ankle and 
foot. It should be noted that the applicant initially also claimed 
that he had lung problems resulting from a 1988 fire he fought, but 
that claim was withdrawn prior to hearing. 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS: 
Due to the length of the litigation in this matter, it is 
appropriate to outline chronologically the procedures that have 
occurred in this case. Prior to the filing of the application for 
hearing in this matter, a dispute arose between the applicant and 
Salt Lake City Corporation as to the extent of impairment that the 
applicant had sustained as a result of his April 6, 1986 industrial 
accident. Several physicians had offered different impairment 
ratings. The application for hearing, claiming permanent total 
disability benefits, was filed with the Industrial Commission on 
April 20, 1990. Most of the initial correspondence and filings in 
this matter mistakenly note June 4, 1986 as the date of injury at 
issue. This was corrected post-hearing, and thereafter, the 
corrected date of April 6, 1986 was substituted on all 
documentation. Discovery matters delayed the scheduling of the 
hearing and it was ultimately held on January 8, 1992. Because of 
the controversy over the extent of impairment related to the 
industrial injury and because of questions regarding the 
applicant's pulmonary problems, the matter was referred to a 
medical panel in March of 1992. The medical panel report was 
received at the Commission on May 13, 1992 and was distributed to 
the parties on June 8, 1992. No objections to the medical panel 
report were filed, and as a result, the ALJ made a tentative 
finding of permanent total disability on August 3, 1992. The 
matter was referred over to the Division of Rehabilitation Services 
(DRS), as required by statute, on that same date. 
DRS determined to do what that agency refers to as an 
"extended evaluation." As a result, the DRS report was not 
submitted to the ALJ until October 18, 1993. The report was 
distributed to the parties on October 19, 1993 and on November 2, 
1993, counsel for Salt Lake City Corporation filed objections to 
the DRS report. On November 5, 1993, the ALJ notified the parties 
that a Hearing on Objections to the Rehabilitation Report would be 
scheduled in order to deal with Salt Lake City's objections. This 
hearing was originally scheduled for January 1994, but was 
continued a number of times due to scheduling conflicts and 
additional discovery measures conducted by Salt Lake City 
Corporation. The final scheduling was for June 14, 1994, but prior 
to that date, the attorneys called the ALJ in a telephone 
conference call. Pursuant to that call, counsel for Salt Lake City 
Corporation indicated that Salt Lake City waived any right it had 
to a Hearing on Objections to the Rehabilitation Report and 
stipulated that the matter was ready for order based on the written 
j"V^i* /*?**-; 
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objections earlier filed by Salt Lake City. The attorneys also 
stipulated to submit the transcript of the deposition of the 
rehabilitation counselor who drafted the DRS report in lieu of his 
testimony that would have been taken at the Hearing on Objections 
to the Rehabilitation Report, The matter was considered ready for 
order as of June 9, 1994, the date of the telephone conference call 
with the attorneys. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant is a male who was 50 years old on the date of 
injury and who is currently 56 years old. At the time of his 
injury in 1986, the applicant was married, but had no minor 
children. The applicant was employed as a firefighter for Salt 
Lake City Corporation on April 6, 1986 and at that time he was a 
captain. Per the application for hearing, he was earning $3,500.00 
per month as of the date of injury, but the applicant later 
stipulated that the figure in the personnel records of $3,191.00 
per month was the correct monthly salary. The applicant worked 
most of his life as a firefighter, but he did have some other work 
experience prior to 1966. The applicant graduated from Granite 
Highschool in Salt Lake City in 1954. He went to trade school 
thereafter from 1958 thorugh 1960 and got a degree in electronics. 
From 1960 through 1965 he worked as at test technician for Sperry 
and then was laid off. He worked for Litton for 2 months after 
that as a gyro technician and then, on January 3, 1966, he was 
hired by Salt Lake City Corporation as a firefighter. He began 
working on a crew fighting fires, presenting educational 
information and doing inspections. As part of the ongoing training 
and conditioning and when actually fighting fires, he was required 
to climb ladders, carry people or dummies out of buildings, pull 
and carry hoses, etc. In 1973 or 1974, he was promoted to 
lieutenant. He continued to do all the regular duties of a 
fireman, but he was also given supervisory duties and training 
duties. At some point in the early 1980's, he was promoted to 
captain and once again he maintained all the regular firefighting 
duties along with his additional supervisory responsibilities. 
Chronologically, the first industrial injury that the 
applicant can recall was an injury that occurred in the winter of 
1967. The applicant recalls spraining his back as a result of 
having a problem with one of the hoses. He was off work for 1 or 
2 weeks and he recalls continuing to see a doctor on and off for a 
couple years thereafter when his back gave him problems. The next 
injury that he recalls occurred on May 6, 1980. The applicant 
r\>^.+ r '~ 
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testified at hearing that he was fighting a fire in a multi-storied 
building and he was pulling a hose into a boiler room. As he did 
so, he fell through a hole in the floor of the boiler room and he 
fell 5 or 6 feet. Varying accounts of this incident are noted in 
the medical records, but most of the accounts are consistent with 
the applicant's testimony at hearing. The applicant recalls that 
his left ankle was the most noticeable of his injuries from the 
fall. The medical records show that X-rays of the left knee, left 
lower leg and left ankle were taken at Cottonwood Hospital on May 
6, 1980 (Exhibit A-l, Tab #34). The films were read to show no 
abnormalities. The applicant recalls indicating to the employer 
that the left leg was too painful for him to work the morning 
following the accident and he believes he was sent to some clinic 
at that time. He was eventually referred to Dr. T. Noonan, an 
orthopedic surgeon, but the medical records do not contain any 
records for the period between May 6, 1980 and July 23, 1980 when 
Dr. Noonan apparently first saw the applicant (Exhibit A-l, Tab 
#24) . 
The applicant was admitted to St. Mark's Hospital on August 
6, 1980 and surgery was performed there on August 7, 1980 (Exhibit 
A-l, Tabs #26-#28) . The impression on admission was: 1) acute 
lumbar strain, 2) probable enchondroma 4th metatarsal with possible 
pathological fracture, and 3) interdigital neuroma 3-4 toes, left. 
It is indicated that the applicant was admitted for surgical 
correction of the interdigital neuroma, repair of the enchondroma 
and conservative management of the lumbar strain. The procedure 
that was performed on August 7, 1980 is listed as: open biopsy, 
left 4th metatarsal, excision interdigital neuroma between 3rd and 
4th metatarsal heads. The applicant was discharged from the 
hospital on August 8, 1980 and Dr. Noonan's letter to the 
City/County Medial Assessment Center was that the traumatic 
interdigital neuroma was removed and that the lesion on the 4th 
metatarsal appeared to have been a healed stress fracture (Exhibit 
A-l, Tab #29) . The applicant testified that what he understood was 
that the bone had opened up and a nerve got caught, thereby 
necessitating the surgery. The applicant returned to work on 
September 8, 1980, but he recalls that the left ankle was easily 
aggravated thereafter. Dr. Noonan's records indicate that the 
applicant returned to see him regarding the left ankle in June of 
1981 and January of 1982. His notes indicate that the applicant 
had episodes of swelling and discomfort brought on particularly by 
walking or standing on concrete floors (Exhibit A-l, Tab #29). Dr. 
Noonan prescribed naprosyn and clinoril and the applicant testified 
that Dr. Noonan told him the pain would eventually go away. 
00131 
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The applicant stated at hearing that he recalls his left 
ankle caused him to trip on the stairs at work at some point after 
the 1980 fall and he remembers that he injured his wrist in this 
incident. The applicant stated that he missed no time from work as 
a result. Not mentioned at hearing, but noted in the medical 
records is a work injury noted by Dr. Noonan. Dr. Noonan filed a 
First Medical Report for an injury on April 9, 1982. The 
description of the injury is "stepped back at work and hit his heel 
on wall, twisted left foot." A sprained left ankle and foot was 
diagnosed and Dr. Noonan indicates that he anticipated only 2 days 
off work (Exhibit A-l, Tab #32). Prior to the 1986 injury at 
issue, there were two more visits to Dr. Noonan in November of 1982 
and May of 1983 where Dr. Noonan noted continued episodes of 
discomfort in the left foot (Exhibit A-l, Tab #33). Dr. Noonan 
continued to prescribe anti-inflammatories. 
On April 6, 1986, the applicant recalls being at the #11 
firestation at the Salt Lake City airport. The applicant was 
inside the "crash truck" and he needed to get out. The applicant 
described the crash truck as having a very high first step. He 
indicated that the first step up into the truck from the ground was 
3 feet high. As the applicant went to step to the ground from the 
truck his left foot hit a 2.5 inch diameter hose filled with water 
that was laying on the ground. The applicant did not expect to 
step onto the hose, and as he did so, he felt a sharp pain in his 
left ankle and he fell to the ground. The applicant stated that 
the pain in his ankle was located where he always had pain in that 
ankle. The applicant recalls that the fall to the ground also hurt 
his left knee. The applicant recalls finishing his shift that day, 
but his battalion chief informed him that he should go to the 
industrial clinic the next day. The applicant was seen at the 
clinic on April 7, 1986 and from the somewhat unclear record it 
appears that an acute ankle sprain was diagnosed. However, there 
is also note of a calcaneous/cuboid joint problem that is noted to 
possibly be due to previous trauma (Exhibit A-l, Tab #15 and 16). 
An X-ray of the left ankle taken at the Salt Lake Industrial Clinic 
was read as normal (Exhibit A-l, Tab #17). 
Eventually, the applicant went to see Dr. R. Kunz, a 
podiatrist. He tried a number of conservative measures to try and 
relieve the pain in the left ankle. Strapping, orthotics and 
injections were all tried over a period extending from June 1986 
through April of 1987 (Exhibit A-l, Tab # 22). The applicant 
recalls that his ankle hurt upon returning to work and even 
prevented him from sleeping at times. He indicated that he just 
/^ff^ *) 
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tried not to walk on it too much and tried to be careful so as not 
to cause additional problems with the foot. The applicant 
testified that he especially had problems with the concrete floors 
in the firestation and he recalls that the pain gradually got worse 
in both the knee and ankle. In June of 1987, Salt Lake City 
Corporation requested that the applicant see Dr. Noonan again 
regarding the left foot. After seeing the applicant, Dr. Noonan 
wrote Salt Lake City Corporation and indicated that the applicant 
had had pain in the left foot since 1983 and that he had also 
developed left knee and left hip pain a swell. All his symptoms 
were aggravated by walking and standing per Dr. Noonan's letter 
(Exhibit A-l. Tab #33) . X-rays of the hip, knee and ankle were 
read as normal and Dr. Noonan prescribed Orudis. In July of 1983, 
the applicant went to see Dr. J. Page, a podiatrist that Dr. Kunz 
suggested for a second opinion. Dr. Page ordered a CT scan at 
Cottonwood Hospital and he read it to show fracture fragments 
between the calcaneous and the cuboid joints with subchondral 
cuboid cysts (Exhibit A-l, Tab #21). Dr. Page apparently tried an 
injection that provided relief for only a short time. In an August 
17, 1987 office note, he indicated that traumatic arthritis and 
partial coalition were contributing to the applicant's pain and he 
opined that conservative measures would not be helpful. He 
recommended surgery, but the applicant was reluctant to get surgery 
at that point (Exhibit A-l, Tab #50). 
In October of 1987, the applicant returned to Dr. Page and 
indicated that he was ready to have the surgery (Exhibit A-l, Tab 
#50). However, apparently the surgery was cancelled and the 
applicant saw Dr. Noonan in November of 1987, with Dr. Noonan 
finding the ankle somewhat improved (Exhibit A-l, Tab #3 5). Dr. 
Noonan recommended an elastic ankle and knee support. Apparently, 
sometime after November of 1987, Salt Lake City Corporation wanted 
a second opinion again, and per the applicant, he was sent to Dr. 
M. Anderson. Dr. Anderson in turn referred the applicant over to 
see Dr. G. L. Rasmussen and the applicant saw Dr. Rasmussen in 
February of 1988. Dr. Rasmussen scheduled the applicant for a 
diagnostic triple joint injection at LDS Hospital that apparently 
was done on March 1, 1988 (Exhibit A-l, Tab #37) . After the 
injection, Dr. Rasmussen prescribed a polypropelene AFO leaf spint 
because the applicant had experienced some relief for the knee when 
he wore a canvas ankle brace with metal straps. The applicant was 
fitted for the brace on March 8, 1988 (Exhibit A-l, Tab #37). Dr. 
Rasmussen wrote Dr. Anderson on March 15, 1988 and he indicated in 
that letter that he read the CT scan of the foot the same as Dr. 
Page had (Exhibit A-l, Tab #38). His overall impression was that 
the applicant had osteoarthritis affecting the triple joints of the 
00* ~~ 
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foot and the medical and patellofemoral compartments of the knee. 
Dr. Rasmussen noted in that letter that fusion surgery for the 
ankle was an option. 
On April 12, 1988, the applicant had a bone scan done of the 
foot which showed increased uptake in the calcaneal cuboid joint 
(Exhibit A-l, Tab #37). When Dr. Rasmussen saw the applicant on 
April 29, 1988, he had the applicant fitted for an orthotic with a 
lateral wedge and this gave the applicant significant relief in the 
ankle and knee. In May of 1988, Dr. Rasmussen scheduled the 
applicant for physical therapy, but there are no actual physical 
therapy records in the medical record exhibit (Exhibit A-l). Dr. 
Rasmussen continued with alternative conservative measures 
including an injection during the summer of 1988. He felt the non-
operative approach was better and the applicant testified at 
hearing that this was because the fusion surgery that was 
recommended for relief of pain would significantly reduce the 
mobility of the ankle. Per the applicant, Dr. Rasmussen told him 
that walking on uneven ground would be difficult with a fused 
ankle. 
On September 1, 1988, the applicant retired from his job as 
captain with the firefighting department of Salt Lake City 
corporation. The applicant testified at hearing that he retired 
because the doctors had been telling him that he would continue to 
have problems with the ankle and because Salt Lake City Corporation 
offered an early retirement incentive packagae which included a 
lump sum payment for a percentage of accrued leave that he had. 
Per the applicant, he actually had wanted to stay with the 
firefighting department at least until his 25th anniversary there 
because f,it was the best job in the world." As it worked out, the 
applicant explained that he actually would have done better 
financially to have continued working, but he was concerned about 
his ankle and the safety implications for himself and other and 
the city was encouraging him to take the early retirement incentive 
package. 
After retiring, in November of 1988, the applicant was seen 
at Humana Hospital Sunrise in Las Vegas, Nevada for chest pain. 
The impression while he was there was: 1) righ lower lobe 
pneumonia, 2) right pleural effusion, 3) partial right middle lobe 
collapse and 4) positive protein derivative. (Exhibit A-l, Tab 
#42) . The applicant followed up with Dr. D. Wilhelm at the Salt 
Lake Clinic and he was hospitalized from December 14, 1988 through 
December 22, 1988 at LDS Hospital for evaluation of the continued 
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lung problems he was having (Exhibit A-l, Tabs #l-#6). Several 
surgical procedures were accomplished during the hospital stay and 
the surgeon, Dr. M. Collins, indicated that the best diagnosis that 
the pathologist could come up with was fibrinous pleuritis. ' He 
suggested that the applicant possibly had a reaction to a noxious 
or toxic substance when he was involved at a chemical fire at the 
airport (Exhibit A-l, Tab #7) . The applicant had additional 
follow-up with Dr. Collins and Dr. Wilhelm after his hospital stay 
through February of 1989 when it was determined that the effusion 
had resolved (Exhibit A-l, Tabs #42, #9, #10). When the applicant 
had an episode of left chest pain, this was determined to be 
musculoskeletal (Exhibit A-l, Tab #42). 
On June 20, 1989, Dr. G. L. Rasmussen wrote Salt Lake City 
Corporation and indicated that the applicant's left lower extremity 
impairment was 21% of the lower extremity, or 8% whole person 
(Exhibit A-l, Tab #39). Salt Lake City Corporation requested a 
second opinion evaluation from Dr. R. Hansen of Utah Orthopedic 
Associates in Salt Lake City. In his letter to Salt Lake City 
Corporation, Dr. Hansen notes that the applicant peristed with left 
knee and foot problems despite of his inactivity. Dr. Hansen noted 
that any motion of the foot caused pain and that the applicant 
especially had problems with uneven ground and stairways. Dr. 
Hansen's impression was that the applicant had post-traumatic left 
foot calcaneal cuboid arthrosis and he recommended the fusion 
surgery that had been suggested for sometime (Exhibit A-l, Tab 
#13) . Dr. Hansen noted that he doubted that the applicant would be 
able to return to firefighting. In a follow-up letter dated August 
25, 1989, Dr. Hansen rated the applicant at 10%, without specifying 
if this was a whole man impairment or a lower extremity impairment 
(Exhibit A-l, Tab #14). 
On January 18, 1990, the applicant saw Dr. B. Prat ley for 
another opinion regarding the impairment in his left lower 
extremity. Dr. Pratley wrote Salt Lake City Corporation with the 
following diagnoses: 1) calcaneal cuboid arthrosis, 2) subtalor 
osteoarthritis, 3) calaneal cuboid osteoarthritis, 4) fascitis, 
plantar, chronic, 5) flexion contracture left knee (Exhibit A-l, 
Tab #36). Dr. Pratley indicated that the applicant had sustained 
a significant injury in 1986 and had been able to get along the 
past 8 or 9 years by altering his gait and his activities. He 
found that the osteoarthritic changes that he noted were caused by 
the trauma in 1986. He rated the applicant's left lower extremity 
at 43% lower extremity or 17% whole person. Salt Lake City 
declined to pay the applicant based on this rating and offered to 
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pay permanent impairment benefits based on a compromise between Dr. 
Rasmussen's 21% lower extremity rating and Dr. Hansen's rating, 
which Salt Lake City feels is a 10% lower extremity rating. The 
compromise offer was for 15.5% of the lower extremity or just over 
19 weeks of benefits (as compared to 53 weeks of benefits which 
would be allowed, if Dr. Prat ley7 s rating were accepted) . The 
parties could not reach an agreement regarding the manner in which 
to figure the applicant's entitlement to permanent impairment 
benefits (PPI), resulting in the applicant filing his application 
for hearing claiming permanent total disability benefits in April 
of 1990. 
For the summer of 1990, from April 22, 1990 through 
September 23, 1990, the applicant got a fulltime job with Hamilton 
Stores in West Yellowstone, Wyoming. This job paid him $850.00 per 
month. The applicant's job was as a fire marshall and he taught 
safety and did fire protection education at the several stores that 
the company operated within Yellowstone Park. The applicant 
testified that the job was very non-strenuous and consisted of 
primarily driving from one store to the other. The applicant 
estimated that he spent 4 of the 8 hour workday driving. In 1991, 
the applicant had planned to doe the seasonal work again, but the 
company wanted to bring someone on for a year-round position. The 
applicant worked that summer from May 6, 1991 through June 14, 1991 
just to train in the person that was to take the year-round 
position. The applicant was pain $875.00 per month during this 
time frame. The applicant testified that he he felt that the cold 
weather in Yellowstone during the winter would be too hard on his 
left ankle and his lungs for him to have taken the year-round 
position. 
When the applicant saw Dr. Rasmussen on August 23, 1991, Dr. 
Rasmussen noted on the X-rays that the foot appeared to be about 
the same, but that the knee had deteriorated significantly with 
lateral patellar tilt and medial joint narrowing. Apparently, Dr. 
Rasmussen recommended knee surgery at that time in addition to the 
ankle surgery that had been earlier recommended (Exhibit A-i, Tib 
# 37). The applicant testified at hearing that his foot has b^ n 
about the same in 1990 and 1991. He stated that the conservative 
measures that have been attempted in order to alleviate the pain 
have not been very successful. He felt that physical therapy was 
not beneficial and that the muscle relaxants only gave him 
temporary improved range of motion. Some of the braces he had 
tried for the ankle reduced his range of motion so severely that he 
did not use them much. The applicant did note that the wedged 
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inner sole supports, that Dr. Rasmussen had prescribed, did help 
him. With respect to activity, the applicant stated that he could 
fish, camp (with no walking) , and that he could play golf once 
every 2 or 3 months if he used a golf cart. He stated he could not 
walk for any prolonged period, could not lift or twist and had to 
avoid concrete floors and any quick movement that would effect the 
ankle. 
The medical panel that was appointed to review the 
applicant's overall impairment consisted of chairman, Dr. G. Moress 
and pulmonologist, Dr. R. Farney. The panel found that the 
applicant's foremost orthopedic problem was his calcaneal cuboid 
arthritis in the left ankle. The panel found that the origin of 
this condition was definitely industrial, with progression of the 
condition having occurred over the years since the 1986 industrial 
accident. The panel stated in its April 15, 1992 report that the 
condition caused significant pain and marked limitation of range of 
motion in the left ankle and foot. The panel concluded that the 
appropriate impairment rating for the left ankle/foot was that 
which would be assigned if the applicant had already had the 
arthrodesis surgery that had been recommended. This was apparently 
based on the panel's feeling that the surgery would improve only 
the applicant's pain level, with the limitation of range of motion 
remaining the same. The panel concluded that the appropriate 
rating would be 11% whole person. The panel also found that the 
the left knee could be assigned a rating of 4% whole person, hut 
the panel found that the knee problems were not associated with the 
1986 industrial accident. With respect to the applicant's 
pulmonary problems, Dr. Farney found that the applicant had no 
functional pulmonary impairment. Dr. Farney found that the 
applicant had chronic bronchitis and sensitivity to environmental 
conditions, but this apparently is not ratable. Dr. Farney also 
noted that the applicant had gastro-esophageal reflux and 
hypertension. 
Based on the applicant's indication that his left anhle 
condition was a significant contributor to his decision to retire 
in 1988, and based on the consensus of medical opinion that the 
industrial accident caused the applicant to have serious left an! :.e 
impairment with associated pain that deteriorates with time, and 
because there was no evidence presented at hearing that the 
applicant was capable of returning to his work as a firefighter, 
the ALJ made a tentative finding that the applicant was permanently 
totally disabled as a result of the April 6, 1986 industrial 
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accident.' On August 3, 1992, the ALJ referred the matter over to 
DRS, as required by U.C.A. 35-1-67, for an analysis of the 
applicant's potential for return to work. 
Based on the transcript of the deposition of the DRS 
rehabilitation counselor assigned to evaluate the applicant's case 
(Frank Miera), the applicant underwent a one-week work evaluation 
from November 2, 1992 through November 6, 1992. This evaluation 
was conducted by DRS personnel trained to administer work 
evaluations. Miera indicated that in the regular course of his 
work as a DRS rehabilitation counselor, he refers applicants for 
work evaluations to be conducted by trained DRS personnel and does 
not administer these tests himself. Miera indicated that he relies 
on the written reports of the evaluators in assessing an 
applicant's potential for rehabilitation. He noted that, based on 
the applicant's IQ and general aptitude, that the applicant did 
qualify for retraining in all categories. 
Miera indicated that he understood that the applicant did 
complete the testing that occurred over a 5-day period from 9:00 AM 
through 5:00 PM. However, per the reports that he received, the 
evaluators noted that the applicant showed definitive physicil 
signs of exhaustion during the testing. Per Miera, and per the 
reports of the work evaluators, the applicant cooperated fully in 
the testing and was very truthful and honest throughout the 
evaluation process. Miera indicated that the evaluators noted that 
the applicant was reluctant to tell the evaluators regarding the 
physical problems he was having during the testing, but when 
pressed, did indicate that he had a constant burning and aching in 
the left knee, ankle and foot. The evaluator noted that the 
applicant had to frequently shift his weight during the testing, 
while he was both sitting and standing, to relieve the symptoms in 
the left lower extremity. This was noted to occur more frequently 
as the testing progressed. It was also noted that the applicr .t 
walked slowly and had gait problems as a result of the left lov.-^r 
extremity symptoms. 
Per Miera, the conclusion of the evaluators was that the 
applicant was unable to demonstrate the physical stamina a d 
endurance to perform sedentary work activities, even on a part-ti-.e 
basis. Miera stated that he found the conclusion of the evaluators 
to be supported by the applicants medical records and therefore 
adopted those conclusions. Miera and the evaluators concluded 
that, if the applicant was to work part-time, he would need a 
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position that did not exceed 20 hours per week and that would allow 
flexibility in completing the 20 hours. Because Miera felt that 
the applicant's physical condition might improve, the applicant v/as 
requested to report-in, over a period of months following the 
testing. Miera stated that the applicant's periodic self-reports 
during the next year did not reflect any improvement in his 
physical condition. As a result, Miera concluded that the 
applicant's limitations, noted on examination in November of 199 2, 
were permanent. He stated at the end of his deposition that is v/as 
possible that the applicant could find a position that would 
accommodate his limitations, but that the availability of such a 
position would be very limited. 
The above-stated DRS conclusions were noted in Miera's 
report to the ALJ, received at the Commission on October 13, 199 3. 
However, that report is fairly short and does not contain all the 
foundational information that was provided pursuant to the March 
1994 depostion of Miera. The report was distributed to the parties 
on October 19, 1993, and on November 2, 1993, Salt Lake city 
Corporation filed objections to the report, along with a 
reiteration of argument made prior to the hearing. With respect to 
the DRS report, Salt Lake City argued that the report was based on 
a finding of limited physical stamina, with no medcial confirmation 
to support that such a limitation existed. With respect to Salt 
Lake City's defenses generally, counsel argued that the applicant 
was not in fact disabled, as is demonstrated by the fact that the 
applicant was able to perform a full-time job during the summers of 
1990 and 1991. Counsel also argued that there was no indication 
that the April 6, 1986 industrial accident was the cause of t e 
applicant's current non-work status. Counsel notes that t e 
applicant never lost any work time as a result of the April 6,ic 6 
accident and then decided to retire in 1988 based on an early 
retirement incentive program offered by Salt Lake City, with no 
mention at that time regarding any problems with the left foot and 
ankle. Finally, counsel argues that the applicant has hid 
unrelated lung and possible heart problems develop since his 
retirement, and that these problems are the true cause of any 
current disabilty. 
On November 5, 1993, the ALJ wrote the parties and indicated 
that she would schedule the matter for an additional hearing o 
deal with Salt Lake City's objections to the DRS report, n 
November 9, 1993, the ALJ received a written response to Salt Lai:e 
City's objections from counsel for the applicant. In this 
response, counsel argues that, in its objections/argument, Salt 
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Lake City did not address the ALJ's prior finding that the 
applicant had suffered physically with his left ankle/foot problems 
prior to his retirement, and had decided to retire primarily 
because several physicians had indicated to him that the left ankle 
and foot would continue to give him problems. Counsel also notes 
that Salt Lake City did not address the medical panel findings that 
the applicant's left ankle/foot condition had progressed since the 
date of injury and warranted a higher rating than was earlier 
assessed by other physicians. Finally, counsel argues that case 
law precedent requires that Salt Lake City show that there is 
suitable steady work available to the applicant, once there is a 
finding that the applicant is not susceptible to rehabilitation. 
Because Salt Lake City has not been able to show that steady work 
is available to the applicant, counsel argues that case 1iw 
requires a finding that he is entitled to permanent totnl 
disability benefits. Counsel comments that the permanent totnl 
disability benefits should be determined to begin as of the dete 
that the applicant retired, notwithstanding his work thereafter, 
because the applicant was only capable of work in a sheltered 
workshop after his retirement. 
The initial scheduling of the Hearing on Objections to the 
Rehabilitation Report was in January of 1994. Prior to tvnt 
scheduling, Salt Lake City requested that the applicant undergo a 
vocational evaluation to be performed by a private rehabilitation 
firm, Intracorp, and requested that he be evaluated for permanent 
impairment by a physician, Dr. S. Knorpp. The applicant underwit 
both evaluations in December of 1993. The Intracorp report no^s 
that the evaluator felt that the physical stamina limitations not d 
by DRS in its report do not apply any longer. This apparently v-s 
based on what the applicant told the evaluator, but furtl -r 
explanation of this conclusion is not provided in the Intraccrp 
report. The report identifies some job positions that the 
applicant would qualify for after some short-term training, 
apparently based on a computer-generated analysis. However, the 
report is very equivocal regarding whether there are current 
position openings in these jobs available to the applicant and 
whether or not placement into these jobs would require that the 
applicant move to the Salt Lake City area. Dr. Knorpp's report 
seems to contradict the Intracorp report somewhat in that Cv-. 
Knorpp conceaas that that the applicant's left foot/ankle conditin 
causes significant work activity restrictions resulting from t'-.e 
pain being aggravated by cold, prolonged sitting, standing ar.d 
walking. Dr. Knorrp also notes that the applicant feels that t! e 
pain continues to progress. Despite the fact that the recommended 
surgery would probably improve the pain, Dr. Knorrp finds the 
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applicant's iecis: :w *• • ; ••: «;-' ':he pa o A-- : ivoid suroory »s 
reasonable, because he notes chat the surgery would predictably 
result in reduced range of motion as well as development of gait, 
hip and low back problems. Dr. Knorrp finds that the 4th Edition 
of the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment would allow 
an 8% whole person rating for the left foot/ankle and 11^ only 
after the proposed fusion surgery was performed. 
a^re rttir^
 rrcbiems LinU: '^  - ~.- necessary 
participants could oe in attendance at the Hearing ;n Objections to 
the Rehabilitation Report. A final scheduling was made for .Tore 
1 4, 1994. Prior to this date, in April of 1994, Salt Lake City 
notified the applicant that he needed - • -itten: a Z-week •.-.•-"-k 
tolerance test that Salt Lake City had arranged in May of :?-'-. 
Counsel for the applicant objected to this further evaLuatirn, 
indicating that the applicant had already agreed to 2 otrvr 
evaluations requested after distribution of the DRS report. 
Counsel stated that the Industrial Commission rules did not allow 
for unlimited evaluations at the request of the employer/carrier. 
In addition, counsel noted that U.C.A. 35-1-67, as it read as :f 
the date of injury in this matter, did not provided for a mandatory 
hearing on the issue of rehabilitation, as it now does (since \z 
was amended in 1988), As such, counsel argues that it 
questionnable that such a hearing is even warranted in this matter. 
On April 27, 1994, the ALJ wrote Salt Lake City and indicated o-e 
agreed with counsel for the applicant and found that the apnlic- t 
would not be considered to be infringing on any inferred discovery 
rights that Salt Lake City might have, if he decided not to att — d 
the work tolerance testing. In addition, the ALJ" noreri v.at, t 
the time of the June 14, 1994 hearing, she would take argument n 
the retroactivity of the 1988 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-67, whi-h 
amendment specifies that a hearing on the issue of renatv.L.tat: -n 
is mandatory after the DRS report is submi tted. 
As noted at the beginning of this order, pursuant to a 7^~e 
9, 1 '994 telephone conference call, and as documented in a June , 
1994 letter to the ALJ from counsel for Salt Lake City, Salt L~ e 
City agreed to waive any right it might have to a Hearina n 
Objections to the Rehabilitation Report and agreed to submit - a 
matter based on argument already in the record and based :-r. * i 
deposition testimony of Frank Miera, the DRS rehob: : . t.r: n 
counselor. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Entitlement to Permanent Total Disability Benefits: 
The ALJ agrees with counsel for the applicant that the 
Hardman case specifies the burden-shifting that applies when 
analyzing an applicant's entitlement to permanent total disability 
benefits, if the industrial injury at issue occurred prior to the 
1988 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-67, as is here the case. Hardman v. 
SLC Fleet Management. 725 P. 2d 1323 (Utah 1986). That case deals 
with "odd lot" cases, or cases in which the industrial injury 
combines with other limitations to effect employability. As 
specified in Hardman, the first requirement of the "odd lotM test 
is that the applicant must show that he can no longer perform the 
duties required in his occupation. If such a finding is made, 
Hardman specifies that a tentative finding of permanent total 
disability is required. Although Salt Lake City has noted that the 
applicant voluntarily retired from his firefighter position, at no 
point has Salt Lake City suggested that the applicant is physically 
capable of returning to that position. As a result of no argument 
being made that the applicant could return to his firefighter job, 
the ALJ felt that this was not really a contested issno. 
Therefore, the ALJ made a tentative finding of permanent total 
disability in August of 1992. That tentative finding was net 
contested by Salt Lake City, which further reinforces the ALJ's 
feeling that Salt Lake City did not then, nor does it now, contest 
the fact that the applicant is unable to return to his prior 
position. The first requirement of the test having been met, the 
second requirement must be analyzed. 
The second requirement of the "odd lot" test, as specified 
in Hardman. is that the applicant must show that he cannot 1 e 
rehabilitated. On this point, the DRS report indicates that the 
applicant is not phsically capable of retraining or return to work 
in a full time position. This conclusion was based on the 
applicant's medical records and a week-long work evaluation 
conducted by DRS. The DRS report identifies the left ankle pain as 
a significant contributor to the applicant's overall stamina or 
lack thereof. Although the Intracorp report suggests that the 
applicant does not have any stamina limitations that would prevent 
him from being rehabilitated, as noted above, it is very unclear 
how Intracorp came to this conclusion. The Intracorp report 
appears to suggest that the applicant himself feels that he ro 
longer has these limitations, but the ALJ is unaware of ary 
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statements from the applicant or his counsel that would suggest 
that he concedes to having improved physically since .November of 
1992, when it was determined that he in fact did have stamina 
limitations. The Intracorp report does not indicate that any 
testing or observation of the applicant's stamina was conducted or 
served as a basis for its conclusion. In addition, the Intracorp 
report appears to indicate that no review of medical records was 
made by the vocational evaluator preparing the report. The ALJ 
therefore finds that the Intracorp evaluator was not fully informed 
regarding the nature of the applicant's physical problems or his 
stamina so as to be able to render an opinion on this aspect of the 
applicant's work capacity. The ALJ finds the DRS report to be 
better supported by documentation and examination and therefore 
adopts the DRS conclusion that the applicant does not have t! !e 
stamina to undergo rehabilitation t-rai ni ng 
It should also be noted that the employer's own physician, 
Dr. Knorrp, states that the applicant, in fact, has progressive 
deterioration in his left ankle which is causing increasing pain 
which limits his ability to do any position that requires prolonr;^d 
sitting, standing or walking. This statement appears to be in li^e 
with the DRS finding that the applicant is incapable of fullti- e 
work or rehabilitation retraining. Finally, the medical pari 
report also confirms the progressive deterioration and signifies- t 
pain and limitation of range of motion in the ankle. Taken a< a 
whole, the ALJ finds that the preponderance of the we 11-four: od 
expert opinion on the applicant's susceptibility to rehabilitation 
supports a finding that the applicant's physical condition, even if 
only the left ankle is taken into consideration, is impaired to the 
extent that he would not be able to undergo rehabilitation 
training. 
Having established that rehabilitation is nut t'easic-
Hardman case specifies that the burden of proof shifts tic * 
employer to show that regular steady work is available tc -* 
applicant. The ALJ finds that the employer has r )t Jer.cr.s:: -:* i 
any "regular steady work" that is available to the applija * i 
DRS report notes that the applicant would be capable of oi^2 
part-time work, with flexible hours, and notes that such a posit: n 
would be very difficult to find. The Intracorp report is the zr y 
evidence that has been presented by the employer that even argua- y 
suggests that regular steady work is available. However, z'r t 
report only lists some positions that the applicant might be 3; e 
to perform after some limited training. The report does : t 
establish that any of these positions are available generally a--d 
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certainly does not establish that the positions are available to 
the applicant. Therefore, the Intracorp report does not support a 
finding that regular steady work is available to the applicant. In 
addition, as noted above, the preponderance of the medical evidence 
indicates that the applicant has a steadily deteriorating condition 
in the ankle that results in significant pain and significant 
activity restrictions as a result. The medical evidence therefore 
supports a finding that the applicant's work capacity is very 
limited, which finding is in turn supportive of the conclusion that 
regular steady work is not readily available to the applicant. Per 
Hardman. if the employer cannot show the availability of regular 
steady work, then the applicant is entitled to an award of 
permanent total disability benefits. 
With respect to the specific arguments set forth by Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake City has argued that the applicant's current 
non-work status is a result of his decision to accept an early 
retirement package offered by Salt Lake City in 1988 and that it is 
not the result of inability to work caused by the left ankle. 
However, as noted above, the ALJ has found otherwise. The 
applicant credibly testified that his left ankle condition war a 
major contributor to his decision to retire. This testimony is 
supported by the medical records which verify continuing treatment 
for the left ankle after the 1986 injury, with no lasting 
improvement resulting and increasing pain and limitation of motion 
noted with the passage of time. Considering that the preponderance 
of the evidence supports a finding that the left ankle condition 
caused the applicant to discontinue working as a firefighter, t e 
fact that the applicant did not specifically tell Salt Lake Ci'y 
his reason for retiring is not particularly probative. 
Salt Lake City has also argured that the applicant misrnd 
no time from work as a result of his 1986 ankle injury, apparently 
as support for the proposition that the ankle injury was not a 
serious one. Although it is unusual for a significant injury 'o 
result in no work time lost, in the instant case, this unusr 1 
result is explained by the fact that the ankle condition is c e 
that deteriorates with time. While the condition was fairly new 
and had not progressed to its current status, the applicant v.ns 
able to continue working, albeit with some difficulty. When it o t 
to the point that it was causing the applicant considerable concern 
and the doctors verified to him that he should not plan on it 
getting better, the applicant decided to discontinue firefighting. 
The sequence is logical and understandable, even if it is unusunl 
that there was no lost time immediately following the injury. 
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....^t *.ar.e ^ tL,y nas argued that the applicant's ability to 
work is demonstrated by the fact that he in fact did work in ir-"0 
and 1991 at a f-.illtime job. Although the ALJ wculi r--t 
characterize this work as a "sheltered workshop11 situation 
counsel for the applicant has described it, certainly the temporary 
seasonal Fire Marshall position that the applicant worked for a 
couple months during the summers of 1990 ar:i 1991 was a /er; jni^ ; :e 
and unusual job. His ability to perform m that position does not 
suggest that he Is capable of truly gainful work. That position 
was not a permanent all-year job at th*r. tir.e and it invol^d 
minimal exertion due to the amount or driving it entailed. T'r^ t 
position is no longer available, having been eliminated to create 
a fulltime permanent position that the applicant ecu Id rvv. perf^m 
in significant part because of his ankle. There has been o 
evidence presented to establish that ,iimilar positions - a 
available to the applicant. The applicant was simply iucvy to ;v e 
found the position at a time when he was still capable f 
performing in the limited capacity that was required by the ; . 
The fact that he was able to perform the job at that tin*3 does : t 
detract from the fact that he currently is mor^ )i rated -G r--* 1 
vie DRS evaluation. 
Finally, Salt Lake cit . -rgued that tliu applies " t 
developed lung and heart problems after his retirement and t!" t 
these problems are the source of his current disability. The 7 I 
finds no evidence of confirmed heart problems in the medir 1 
records. There is some evidence that the applicant did in f: --t 
have some pulmonary problems in late 1988 and early 1989 and i . 
Farney (medical panel member) did confirm that the applicant l s 
chronic bronchitis currently. There are some references to ^ e 
applicant's pulmonary problems in the DRS report and apparently t e 
problems do contribute to his decreased stamina. However, t e 
extent of the applicant's pulmonary problems is very ill-defined t 
this point. It simply is unclear to what extent these problvs 
contribute to any disability. There is no impairment associa4 d 
with the pulmonary problems and there has been no evide* e 
presented that in fact the pulmonary problems are the source of t e 
applicant's inabilty to work. In addition, when the applies-t 
decided to discontinue working, he apparently did' not have r e 
pulmonary problems and was only faced with the left ankle and kr e 
condition. It appears that the pulmonary problems developed af" r 
the ankle condition had deteriorated to the point that I ' e 
applicant could not do firefighting and thus the pulmonary problo-s 
were not the cause of the applicant's discontinuance of work. 
Afif 
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Having found that the case law precedent applicable to 
permanent total disability awards, as applied to this case, 
requires an award of benefits in this case, and having addressed 
the defenses raised by Salt Lake City and found that they do n-t 
alter the results reached by application of the case law precedert, 
the ALJ finds that an award of permanent total disability benefits 
is appropriate. 
Computation of Benefits: 
The most significant finding with respect to the computation 
of the award in this case is the date on which the permanent totil 
disability benefits should begin. Presumably, the benefits she'd 
begin at the point at which" it appears that the applicant bec^ e 
totally disabled. Counsel for the applicant has suggested t* t 
this is the date of his retirment in 1988, because thereafter e 
worked only in a sheltered workshop scenario. Salt Lake City bis 
not addressed this issue at all. The ALJ finds that the seasonal 
Fire Marshall job was not truly a sheltered workshop. It was a 
seasonal job requiring minimal exertion and maxinal 
experience/training. It is clear in the record that the applicant 
has not worked since he discontinued the seasonal work on June 14, 
1991. Therefore, the ALJ finds that the applicant's disability 
began at least as of June 14, 1991. The question then beco~ s 
whether he became disabled before that date. 
It is unclear exactly what the applicant's physi^l 
condition was just after retiring. He was having pulmon^ y 
problems in late 1988 and early 1989 which required s^  e 
hospitalization. There has been no testimony and there are no 
medical records (excepting impairment evaluations) for the period 
of March 1989 through when he he began work again in May of 19~"). 
Thereafter, there is also no information regarding the applican''s 
physical condition during the time he was off work until he be' n 
work in May of 1991. Any disability as early as late 1988 - d 
early 1989 would seem to be attributable to the applicant's n d 
for hospitalization for pulmonary problems at that ti-^. 
Thereafter, he was able to work at least seasonally. No oti^r 
information regarding his disability status between 1988 and 1^1 
has been presented. As such, the ALJ finds that the prepondera- e 
of the evidence does not support a finding of total disabil y 
until the applicant discontinued his seasonal work on June lA, 
1991. The ALJ therefore finds that permanent total disability 
benefits should begin as of June 15, 1991. 
(V'f ~ 7, 
ORDER 
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Based on a monthly salary of $3,1^1.00 at the tjie of Mie 
injury, the average weekly wage, per U.C.A. 3b-1-75, would be 
$736.95 ($3,191,011 - 4-33). Taking 2/3 of that amount, t-^ e 
compensation rate would be $491.55 ($736.95 x .667). Tint excels 
the maximum rate for permanent total disability as of |^ i in lpo6 
and thus the maximum of $275.00/week applies. 
The ALJ finds tha. no apportionment of the init i tl 512 /e^ks 
is applicable as between Salt Lakn \ it1) and the Emplo\prs 
Reinsurance Fund. This is because the only impairment that his 
been rated (per the medical panel) is the applicant's inkle (M% 
whole person) and his knee (4% whole person) , The panel di:l r^t 
indicate that the ankle injury aggravated the knee condition d 
thus the only way the Employers Reinsurance Fund would h e 
liability for the initial 312 weeks would be if the applicant 1 
at least an overall 20% impairment, with at least 10% mdustr 1 
(per U.C.A. 35-1-69). The applicant has not been rated as hav ng 
at least 20% overall impairment and thus no apportionment of the 
initial 312 weeks is applicable. As a result, Salt Lake City is 
responsible for the initial 312 weeks of benefits, with ^ e 
Employers Reinsurance Fund taking over payment of the benefits 
thereafter. Salt Lake City's total liability would therefore e 
$85,800.00 (312 weeks x $275.00/week). Accrued benefits as of J y 
2, 1994 is equal to 159 weeks or $43,725.00. Thereafter, Salt I e 
City needs to pay the applicant periodically at the rat^ f 
$275.00/week until June 9, 1997 when the Employerr Peinsuri e 
Fund will begin to pay benefits. 
Uitorney fees are figured on the generation ol 3 12 *eeK - ^ f 
benefits, or $85,800.00. Per Commission rule R568-1-7 ' p 
attorney fee would be $5,250.00 (20% of the first $15,000.00 p s 
15% of the next $lfn, 000.00 generated) plus 10% of the remainder f 
$55,800.00 or $5,580.00, for a total of $10r83Q.GO. This exce s 
the maximum fee specified lir ruin °n thm maximum r ?>",^ oi 0 
applies. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City 
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay the applicant, Warren Hoskings, 
permanent total disability benefits at the rate of $275.00 per 
week, for 312 weeks, or a total of $85,800.00 for his April 6, 1936 
industrial injury. The accrued amount of $43,725.00 is due and 
payable in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 
35-1-78, and less the attorney fees to be awarded below• The 
remaining liability should be paid periodically to the applicant, 
at the rate of $275.00 per week, until June 9, 1997. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City 
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay all medical expenses incurred as 
the result of the April 6, 1986 industrial accident; said expends 
to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City 
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay Susan Black and James Blar-':, 
attorneys for the applicant, the sum of $7,500.00, plus the 
percentage of interest that is appropriate per R568-1-7, for 
services rendered in this matter, the same to be deducted from the 
aforesaid accrued award to the applicant, and to be remitted 
directly to the office of James Black. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund shall prepare the necessary vouchers directing the 
State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Employers Reinsurance Fund, 4:o 
place the applicant, Warren Hoskings, on the Employers Reinsurar -e 
Fund payroll as of June 9, 1997, with weekly payments to be made *:o 
him at the rate of $275.00 per week. Said payments to f e 
applicant shall continue for the remainder of his life, or un' 1 
further notice from the Commission. 
oot^s 
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^ ^ i-JRTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15= days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-4fib-
12(2) Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED t h i s ^ > 
tu 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Lav/ Judge 
| :• j * 
\ •• i 4 •* 
V? .,; ! , 
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Appendix 5 
Peck v. Eimco, 748 P.2d 572 (Utah 1987) 
Alma E. PECK, Plaintiff, 
r. 
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO., 
Second Injury Fund and Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Defendants. 
No. 20914. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 31, 1987. 
Workers' compensation claimant chal-
lenged Industrial Commission order deny-
ing him permanent total disability benefits. 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, Associate 
C J., held that claimant was entitled to per-
1. See generally, Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial 
RTER, 2d SERIES 
manent total disability benefits under odd-
lot doctrine. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Workers' Compensation <£=>1636 
Employee seeking permanent total dis-
ability benefits under odd-lot doctrine must 
first present prima facie case that no regu-
lar, dependable work is available to him, 
and to do that, employee must present evi-
dence that he can no longer perform dunes 
required in his occupation and that he can-
not be rehabilitated to perform some other 
type of employment U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
2. Workers' Compensation <3=1375 
Once employee seeking permanent to-
tal disability benefits under odd-lot doctrine 
has presented prima facie case, burden 
shirts to employer to prove existence of 
regular, steady work that employee can 
perform, taking into account employee's ed-
ucation, work experience, mental capacity 
and age. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
3. Workers' Compensation <s=1636 
Employee presented prima facie case 
of permanent total disability under odd-lot 
docmne; evidence, including letters from 
physicians, medical panel's report, and eval-
uation of employee by Division of Rehabili-
tation Services showed that employee was 
unable to perform normal duties of his 
occupation, that he required eight of his 
fellow employees to perform the bulk of his 
work for him, and that he suffered continu-
al pain as a result of his industrial injuries. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
4. Workers' Compensation «=>1636-
Although fact that employee returned 
to work following industrial injury may be 
relevant in determining employee's ability 
to perform duties of occupation, and thus, 
may be factor in assessing whether em-
ployee has suffered any loss of earning 
capacity entitling him to permanent total 
disability under odd-lot doctrine, that fact 
alone is not conclusive of his ability to 
work nor is it dispositive of issue of earn-
ing capacity. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
Commission. 107 Utah 24, 151 ?2d 467 (1944). 
PECK Y. EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO. Utah 573 
CUe«»74S ?2d 572 (Utah 1987) 
5. Workers' Compensation «»1375 
At most, fact that employee returns to 
work after industrial injury creates rebut-
table presumption that he has not sus-
tained permanent and total disability under 
odd-lot doctrine. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
6. Workers' Compensation e=>1636 
Fact that employee returned to work 
following industrial injury did not prevent 
him from recovering permanent total dis-
ability under odd-lot doctrine; employee 
presented uncontroverted evidence, not 
only of his physical impairment, but also of 
his inability to perform his job. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-67. 
7. Workers' Compensation «»803 
Mere fact that employee has retired 
will not adversely affect determination of 
permanent total disability when employee 
had demonstrated that his disability from 
industrial injury significantly influenced his 
decision to retire. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
8. Workers' Compensation <*=>803 
Only when finding is made and sup-
ported by evidence that employee's retire-
ment is not substantially motivated by his 
industrial injury, but is due primarily to 
personal or other reasons, will denial of 
disability benefits be upheld on basis of 
voluntary retirement U.C.A.1953, 35-1-
67. 
9. Workers' Compensation $=*803 
Fact that worker retired on the day 
after he turned 65 did not preclude him 
from recovering permanent total disability 
benefits under odd-lot doctrine in the face 
of evidence that retirement was substan-
tially related to his industrial injury. U.C. 
A.1953, 3S-1-S7. 
10. Workers' Compensation *»847 
Industrial Commission's adoption of 
medical panel's findings of physical impair-
ment, without further evaluation of effect 
which that impairment, when combined 
with other factors, might have on workers' 
compensation claimant's wage-earning ca-
pacity, constituted failure by Commission 
to carry out its administrative responsibili-
ties under odd-lot doctrine. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-S7. 
Roger D. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for 
Peck. 
Robert R. Finch, Salt Lake City, for Eim-
co. 
Erie Boorman, Salt Lake City, for Second 
Injury Fund. 
David L Wilkinson, Ralph L. Finlayson, 
Salt Lake City, for Indus. Comn. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
This is an action by plaintiff Alma E. 
Peck challenging an Industrial Commission 
order denying him permanent total disabili-
ty benefits. We reverse and remand. 
While employed by Eimco Processing 
Equipment Company as an industrial main-
tenance mechanic, Peck suffered two com-
pensable industrial injuries which resulted 
in permanent physical impairment The 
first injury, on September 12, 1980, re-
quired surgery on Peck's right knee and 
caused a two percent impairment of the 
body. The second injury, on December 29, 
1982, necessitated surgery on Peck's lower 
back and resulted in a ten percent loss of 
body function. Peck was then sixty-three 
years old. 
Although Peck's last injury occurred in 
December, 1982, he continued to work until 
March 7, 1983, when his doctor prescribed 
surgery. On March 17, back surgery was 
performed. On June 27, 1983, Peck re-
turned to work under light-duty restric-
tions. Peck applied to the Commission for 
temporary total disability benefits from 
March 7 to June 27 and for permanent 
partial disability benefits thereafter, claim-
ing that the surgery on his back failed to 
restore his ability to return to his normal 
work. The Commission set a hearing for 
October 17, 1983. 
After the hearing, the administrative law 
judge appointed a medical panel to evaluate 
Peck's case. The medical panel concluded 
that Peck suffered a twenty-four percent 
preexisting physical impairment and that 
the industrial injuries • combined with the 
preexisting impairments to produce a thir-
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ty-three percent permanent physical impair-
ment. 
On April 27, 1984, Peck turned sixty-five 
years old. The next day, April 28, ten 
months after returning to work following 
the back surgery, Peck retired. Peck then 
requested a determination regarding per-
manent total disability from the Commis-
sion. A second hearing was set for Sep-
tember 25,1984. After the second hearing, 
the Commission sent Peck to the Division 
of Rehabilitation Services to determine 
whether he could be rehabilitated for other 
employment The rehabilitation officer 
concluded that due to his age and physical 
impairments, Peck was not a good candi-
date for rehabilitation. 
On February 28, 1985, the administrative 
law judge issued his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Among his findings, 
the judge stated: 
The Applicant worked effectively before 
the December 1982 injury despite his 27% 
pre-existing impairment The De-
cember 1982 incident only added a 10% 
impairment The Applicant was able to 
work effectively in his job for about a 
year after his injuries healed. There is 
no evidence of new injury, nor is there 
any medical evidence that the Applicant 
was taken off the job April 28, 1984, 
because of his old injuries. The Appli-
cant just plain retired. 
The judge ruled, however, that Peck was 
entitled to temporary total disability bene-
fits for the period from March 7 to June 27 
and, "[w]ith great reluctance," that Peck 
was permanently and totally disabled under 
existing Utah case law and entitled to bene-
fits accordingly. 
Defendant Second Injury Fund appealed 
to the Commission to reverse the award of 
permanent total disability benefits. Al-
though the Commission upheld the award 
of temporary total disability benefits, it 
reversed the award of permanent total dis-
ability benefits. The Commission based its 
reversal on the judge's findings that Peck 
"did not leave work on April 27, 1984 be-
cause of old or new injuries'1 and that Peck 
"just plain retired." The Commission con-
cluded that Peck failed to meet "his burden 
in showing an inability to return to work," 
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 
(Supp.1987). 
Peck seeks review of the Commission's 
order denying permanent total disability 
benefits. The issues raised are (1) whether 
Peck is entitled, due to his industrial inju-
ries, to permanent total disability benefits 
under the odd-lot doctrine pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67, and (2) whether 
there is evidentiary support for the find-
ings of fact made by the administrative law 
judge and adopted by the Commission that 
Peck was "able to work effectively in his 
job for about a year after his injuries 
healed" and that he "just plain retired." 
L 
The ultimate issue presented by this case 
is whether Peck is entitled to permanent 
total disability benefits provided by Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 under the odd-lot doc-
trine enunciated in Marshall v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). 
In Marshall, the Court stated, "Under 
the odd-lot doctrine, . . . total disability may 
be found in the case of workers who, while 
not altogether incapacitated for work, are 
so handicapped that they will not be em-
ployed regularly in any well-known branch 
of the labor market" 681 P.2d at 212 
(quoting 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen i 
Compensation § 57.51, at 10-164.24 
(1983)). The Court further stated: 
[A] workman may be found totally dis-
abled if by reason of the disability result-
ing from his injury he cannot perform 
work of the general character he was 
performing when injured, or any other 
work which a man of his capabilities may 
be able to do or to learn to do 
Id at 211 (quoting United Park City 
Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 412, 
393 P.2d 800, 801-02 (1964)) (emphasis 
omitted). The Court further stated that 
the term "disability" means the loss of 
wage-earning capacity and that a disability 
must be assessed in terms of the specific 
individual who has suffered a work-related 
injury, taking into account such factors as 
age, education, training, and mental capaci-
ty. "It is the unique configuration of these 
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factors that together will determine the 
impact of the impairment on the individu-
al's earning capacity." Id. at 211. See 
also Norton v. Industrial Comm% 728 
P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986); Hardman v. 
Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 
P.2d 1323, 1326-27 (Utah 19S6). Further-
more, Professor Larson states: 
"Total disability" in compensation law 
is not to be interpreted literally as utter 
and abject helplessness. Evidence that 
claimant has been able to earn occasional 
wages or perform certain kinds of gain-
ful work does not necessarily rule out a 
finding of total disability nor require that 
it be reduced to partial 
. . . The essence of the test is the prob-
able dependability with which claimant 
can sell his services in a competitive la-
bor market, undistorted by such factors 
as business booms, sympathy of a partic-
ular employer or friends, temporary good 
luck, or the superhuman efforts of the 
claimant to rise above his crippling handi-
caps. 
2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Com-
pensation § 57.51(a), at 10-164.65,10-164.^ 
84(18) (1987) (footnotes omitted). 
[1,2] We enunciated in Marshall the 
procedure for an employee to prove that he 
is entitled to permanent total disability ben-
efits under the odd-lot doctrine. The em-
ployee must first present a prima facie 
case that no regular, dependable work is 
available to him. To do this, the employee 
must present "evidence that he can no 
longer perform the duties required in his 
occupation and that he cannot be rehabili-
tated" to perform some other type of em-
ployment Marshall 681 P.2d at 212. 
Once the employee has presented a prima 
facie case, "the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to prove the existence of regular, 
steady work that the employee can per-
form, taking into account the employee's 
education [work experience], mental capaci-
ty and age." Id. Failure by the employer 
to meet its burden of proof entitles the 
employee to permanent total disability ben-
efits. 
[3] Peck argues that he presented a 
prima facie case of permanent total disabili-
ty under the odd-lot doctrine by proving 
that he was sixty-three years old at the 
time of his last industrial accident, had no 
formal education beyond high school, 
worked his entire life in heavy manual la-
bor, was no longer capable of performing 
the duties of his job, and could not be 
rehabilitated. The administrative law 
judge, however, found that Peck "was able 
to .work effectively in his job for about a 
year after his injuries healed" and that 
Peck "just plain retired" the day after he 
turned sixty-five years old. 
In reviewing the evidentiary basis for 
findings of fact made by the Industrial 
Commission, this Court inquires only 
whether the Commission's findings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Bigfoots 
Inc. v. Industrial Comm% 714 P.2d 1152, 
1153 (Utah 1986). On a thorough review of 
the record, we conclude that the findings of 
fact made by the administrative law judge 
and adopted by the Commission are unsup-
ported by the evidence and must be set 
aside. 
The record contains evidence introduced 
primarily in two hearings, including letters 
from physicians, a medical panel's report, 
and an evaluation of Peck by the Division 
of Rehabilitation Services. The record is 
replete with evidence that Peck was unable 
to perform the normal duties of his occupa-
tion, that he required the aid of his fellow 
employees who performed the bulk of his 
work for him, and that he suffered continu-
al pain as a result of his industrial injuries. 
For example, in the first hearing, on 
October 17, 1983, four months after re-
turning to work following his back sur-
gery, Peck testified that he could no longer 
perform the duties of his job. He testified 
that his doctor told him to "be careful, 
move slow and not lift any more than I 
have to" and that he "hoped my co-workers 
would take the brunt of the load and help 
me so that I could carry on." He also 
testified that he was unable to lift anything 
or bend over because of pain in his legs and 
back and that after working a few days, his 
leg would go numb. Peck's own testimony 
was supported in the record by two letters 
written to Eimco by Peck's doctor. In the 
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first letter, dated one week before Peck 
returned to work June 27, 1983, the doctor 
advised Eimco that Peck would require 
light-duty work and good care in the exer-
cise of his duties. The doctor also stated, 
"Cooperation from his supervisors and co-
workers would be helpful to [Peck]." In 
the second letter, dated one month after 
Peck returned to work, the doctor notified 
Eimco that Peck was "concerned about his 
ability to perform [the] heavy work as-
signed to him" because of his impairments. 
The doctor stated that Peck was "trying to 
do his work and I believe is conscientiously 
pursuing this goal/' but "[w]hether or not 
he will continue to be able to carry out the 
duties assigned to him we will simply have 
to wait and see." 
In addition to Peck's testimony, three of 
his fellow employees were present at the 
hearing and, upon agreement of the par-
ties, proffered their testimony through 
Peck's attorney. According to the prof-
fered testimony, one of the witnesses 
"would testify as to [Peck's] limitations 
from and after [his back injury and] how 
people have had to help him, [and] the fact 
that he has really been getting along with-
their help." 
At the second hearing, on September 25, 
1984, five months after Peck retired from 
Eimco, Peck again testified that he could 
not adequately perform his work. When 
asked what kind of job activities he did 
upon returning to work, Peck answered: 
Well, I was still in maintenance, but I 
wasn't able to do my work. I couldn't 
have stayed there, but the guys I worked 
with were kind enough to take the buffer 
and make it possible for me to hang on. 
They did all the lifting. If I had re-
quired any extra lifting or anything, they 
helped me with it because I couldn't do 
it 
When asked to specify the work consti-
tuting his normal duties that he could no 
longer perform, Peck stated: 
Well, in lifting, a lot of that machinery 
you have to work it into place. You take 
a big gearbox out, you have to let it 
down, and you have to manhandle it, or 
you take out gears and they're hard to 
lift I couldn't do the work that I 
had done all the years I'd been there. 
When asked his reasons for retiring, 
Peck responded that one day he and a 
fellow employee were moving a big gear-
box, trying to get it into place, when "[m]y 
back gave out on me, my legs went, I fell 
down, I hit my head . . . and if someone 
had been depending on me supporting my 
share of it . . . somebody could have been 
hurt very bad." He also testified that an-
other reason he retired was that his depart-
ment had just undergone a reorganization 
which split-up the crew he had been work-
ing with and would require that each em-
ployee do more jobs by himself and that he 
just could not do the work. 
At the second hearing, Dr. Holbrook, 
who headed the medical panel, testified. 
When Peck's attorney asked Dr. Holbrook 
his opinion of whether Peck was physically 
capable of doing his work at Eimco, he 
replied: 
I think it's a reasonable assumption that 
he might or might not . . . you just about 
have to follow him around all day for a 
lot of days. But, if Mr. Peck says he 
can't do it, I believe that would be a 
reasonable assumption to make, based 
upon all the various impairments that he 
has. 
Additional evidence supports Peck's 
claims that he was unable to adequately 
perform his job following his injuries. The 
medical panel's report, issued prior to the 
second hearing, states that Peck's knees 
are "aggravated by his work activities be 
cause of the weakness of his back throwing 
more stress on his knees when he lifts" and 
that his right knee "does occasionally pop," 
but that mostly there "is a deep ache that 
becomes very sore with a lot of activities." 
Referring to Peck's back, the report states, 
"He does still get some numbness and tin-
gling in the right lower extremity particu-
larly with lifting " The report also 
states that Peck "has returned to work but 
is working more as a helper." In further 
support of Peck's claims, the Rehabilitation 
Services evaluation of Peck states that his 
"back and knee are a continuing problem" 
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good candidate for a principal factor in the Commission's dem-and that he "is not a 
Rehabilitation." 
Nowhere in the record did Eimco ever 
contradict either Peck's testimony or that 
of his fellow employees that he was unable 
to perform his job. Nor did Eimco present 
any evidence or testimony that Peck could, 
and did, adequately perform his job or the 
duties of any other job generally available. 
Eimco attempts to support the Commis-
sion's finding that Peck worked effectively 
in his job following his injuries by citing 
that portion of the record wherein Peck 
was asked if he had ever "had to turn down 
any jobs that had been assigned to" him 
and Peck answered that he had not 
However, a proper reading of the context 
of Peck's answer quickly dispels any notion 
that it supports the Commission's finding. 
Peck was asked, "[A]re you able to per-
form the jobs assigned to you?" He re-
sponded, "[J]ust with help." Eimco's attor-
ney then rephrased the question and asked, 
"[H]ave you had to turn down any jobs?" 
Peck replied that he had not accepted any. 
At that point, the judge intervened: 
THE COURT: You haven't been as-_ 
signed any jobs or you haven't— 
THE WITNESS: Any jobs that weren't 
very minor jobs. The jobs I have worked 
on, others have been with me and taken 
the brunt of it and I have been more a 
helper than anything else and that's 
about all I have been, is a helper. 
THE COURT: The question was, have 
you had to turn down any jobs that have 
been assigned to you. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
In this context, Peck's response that he had 
not turned down any jobs that had been 
assigned to him does not support a conclu-
sion that he was capable of performing the 
task3 required in his job. On the contrary, 
Peck not only explained that he was unable 
to perform his normal duties, but also that 
Eimco had not assigned him the types of 
jobs he had performed prior to his injury. 
Next, Eimco argues that Peck's return to 
work following his last injury supports the 
judge's findings. Evidently, the fact that 
Peck returned to work and continued to 
work until he retired at age sixty-five was 
al of permanent total disability benefits. 
The Commission stated: 
In the Marshall case, the Applicant was 
unable to return to work after his indus-
trial accident. Here, [Peck] was obvious-
ly able to return to work because in fact 
he did. [Peck] worked for nearly one 
full year after his final industrial acci-
dent, and retired on the day after he 
turned sixty-five years old. The facts in 
this case do not show that [Peck] has met 
his burden of proof in showing inability 
to return to work as is required by [Utah 
Code Ann. § 36-1-67], 
[4] Although the fact that an employee 
returns to work following an industrial in-
jury may be relevant in determining the 
employee's ability to perform the duties of 
his occupation and thus may be a factor in 
assessing whether the employee has suf-
fered any loss of earning capacity, that 
fact alone is not conclusive of his ability to 
work, nor is it dispositive of the issue of his 
earning capacity. We have recently held 
that "[o]dy where the employee returns to 
work under normal conditions will the pre-
sumption of no loss of earning capacity 
stay unassailed." Norton v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 728 P.2d at 1028. 
[5] In Norton, we held that the fact 
that the claimant returned to work and 
continued to work for six years following 
his industrial accident "did not automatical-
ly disqualify him from receiving permanent 
total disability benefits, where the facts 
indicatefd] that throughout the remainder 
of his employment he was not restored to 
health." Id. Other jurisdictions have also 
awarded permanent total disability benefits 
even though the claimant returned to work 
following the industrial injury. See Rob-
erts v. WPBT, 395 So.2d 233, 234 (FlaJDist 
CtApp.1981); Liberty MuL Ins. Co. v. 
Archer, 108 Ga.App. 563, 564, 134 S.E.2d 
204, 205 (1963); Sehober v. Mountain Bell 
Tel, 96 N.M. 376, 381, 630 P.2d 1231, 1236 
(N.M.CtApp.1980); Harmon v. SA1F, 71 
Or.App. 724, 727, 693 P.2d 1366, 1368 
(1985); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. 
Armstrong, 572 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex.Civ. 
App.1978). See also Allen v. Fireman's 
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Fund Ins. Co., 71 Or.App. 40, 45-46, 691 
P.2d 137, 140 (1984). But see Special In-
dent. Fund v. Stockton, 653 P.2d 194, 196 
(Okla.1982). At most, the fact that an em-
ployee returns to work after an industrial 
injury creates a "rebuttable presumption 
that the claimant has not sustained perma-
nent and total disability." Special Indent. 
Fund v. Stockton, 653 P.2d at 198. 
[6] In this case, Peck presented uncon-
troverted evidence not only of his physical 
impairment, but also of his inability to per-
form his job, including evidence that he 
was in continual pain and that his fellow 
employees did much of his work for him. 
Eimco did not controvert Peck's evidence, 
and as the record stands, Peck clearly re-
butted any presumption that he was able to 
work effectively following his injuries. 
[7] Eimco next contends that the 
judge's finding that Peck "just plain re-
tired" the day after he turned sixty-five 
years old supports the Commission's denial 
of permanent total disability benefits.1 In 
Marshall, however, we held that the deter-
mination whether to award permanent total_ 
disability benefits must focus on the de^ 
cline in claimant's wage-earning capacity 
and not on the claimant's eligibility to re 
tire. 681 P.2d at 213. The mere fact that 
an employee has retired will not adversely 
affect a determination of permanent total 
disability when the employee has demon-
strated that his disability from the industri-
al injury significantly influenced his deci-
sion to retire. See Arizona Pub. Sen\ Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 145 Ariz. 117, 119, 
700 P.2d 504, 506 (Ariz.CtApp.1985); Lib-
erty Mut Ins. Co. v. Archer, 108 Ga.App. 
563, 564, 134 S.E.2d 204, 205 (1963); Moly 
neux v. New York Tel Co., 101 A.D.2d 903, 
903, 475 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (N.Y.App.Div. 
1984); Bahor v. New York Tel Co., 91 
A.D.2d 756, 756, 458 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (N.Y. 
App.Div.1982); Robinson v. New York Tel 
Co., 86 A.D.2d 916, 916, 448 N.Y.S.2d 252, 
253 (N.Y.App.Div.1982); Wheeling-Pitts-
burgh Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compen-
1. The fact that Peck retired is, of course, true. 
If that is all that the Commission meant by its 
finding, it would have little significance. How-
ever, we read the finding to indicate that the 
sation Appeal BcL, 70 Pa.Cmwlth. 100, 452 
A.2d 611, 613 (1982). See also Tsuchiya-
ma v. Kahului Trucking and Storage, 2 
Haw.App. 659, 63S P.2d 1381, 1382 (Haw. 
CtApp.1982). 
[8] Only when a finding is made and 
supported by evidence that the employee's 
retirement is not substantially motivated 
by his industrial injury, but is due primarily 
to personal or other reasons, will a denial 
of disability benefits be upheld on the basis 
of voluntary retirement See Saenger v. 
Liberty Carton Co., 231 N.W.2d 693, 695 
(Minn.1979); Cameron v. Carrier Air 
Conditioning Co., 85 A.D.2d 364, 865, 446 
N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y.App.Div.1981); Osowski 
v. Board of Coop. Educ. Serv., 78 A.D.2d 
740, 741, 432 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (N.Y.App. 
Div.1980). 
[9] Since none of the defendants has 
produced evidence that Peck was able to 
perform his job adequately or that his re-
tirement was not substantially related to 
his industrial injury, we must conclude that 
the Commission's findings are wholly un-
supported by the evidence. 
We find that Peck presented a prima 
facie case entitling him to permanent total 
disability benefits under the odd-lot doc-
trine, as set forth in Marshall The follow-
ing language from Marshall controls this 
case: 
He presented uncontroverted evidence of 
his impairment, his inability to perform 
the work required by his job and the 
opinion of the division of vocational reha-
bilitation that he could not be rehabilitat-
ed. He also testified that prior to his 
injury he had fully intended to work rath-
er than to retire. 
681 P.2d at 213. 
On this showing, the burden shifted to 
Eimco to demonstrate the availability of 
regular work which Peck could perform to 
indicate whether he had any reasonable 
wage-earning capacity. Eimco relied only 
on the facts that Peck returned to work 
Commission believed that Peck retired because 
he simp'y desired to do so rather than being, in 
effect, compelled to do so. 
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following his injury and then retired ten 
months later. Thus, Eimco failed to show 
any reasonable wage-earning capacity 
which rebutted Peck's prima facie entitle-
ment to permanent total disability benefits. 
II. 
[10] This Court may set aside the Com-
mission's award if unsupported by the find-
ings of fact Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-84(2) 
(1974). In this case, the administrative law 
judge adopted the findings of the medical 
panel that Peck's total physical impairment 
was thirty-three percent However, nei-
ther the judge nor the Commission in its 
review of the judge's decision made any 
separate assessment of Peck's disability by 
calculating the effect that factors such as 
age, education, and training, in addition to 
his permanent physical impairments, had 
on his wage-earning capacity and his ability 
to compete in a competitive job market 
We have previously held that the Commis-
sion's adoption of a medical panel's find-
ings of physical impairment, without fur-
ther evaluation of the effect which that 
impairment, when combined with other 
factors, might have on a claimant's wage^ " 
earning capacity, constitutes a failure by 
the Commission to carry out its administra-
tive responsibilities under the well-recog-
nized odd-lot doctrine. See Norton, 728 
P.2d at 1027; Hardman v. Salt Lake City 
Fleet Management, 725 P.2d at 1326. In 
short, the Commission's findings on disabil-
ity are therefore inadequate to support a 
denial of permanent total disability bene-
fits. 
ability and a recomputation of benefits 
based on permanent total disability. 
KALL, CJ., and HOWE, DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
III. 
In sum, we hold that the Commission's 
finding that Peck "was able to work effec-
tively in his job for about a year after his 
injuries" and that he "just plain retired," 
are unsupported by the evidence and must 
therefore be set aside. We also hold that 
the denial of permanent total disability ben-
efits is unsupported by the Commission's 
findings of fact Accordingly, we reverse 
and remand this case to the Commission 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion, including a reassessment of dis-
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